LANDMARK JUDGEMENTS

 8uShri B. P. Hira Works vs Shri C. M. Pradhan

Factual matrix

The Court of Appeal dealt with a group of 174 appeals by special leave arising from several application made against B.P. Hira, Works Manager at the Central Railway Workshop and Factory in Parel, Bombay, under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, claiming overtime wages since 1948. The main judgment was delivered by the Payment of Wages Authority, Bombay, in the application filed by C.M. Pradhan, which gave rise to Civil Appeal No. 131 of 1957. The respondent claimed that he was entitled to overtime wages for work on Sundays when he was not given a holiday within three days prior to or three days subsequent to the Sundays on which he worked.

The appellant conceded that the respondent had not been given a holiday within the three days prior to or the three days subsequent to the Sundays on which he worked as required by s. 52 of the Indian Factories Act. The respondent alleged that he was a worker within the meaning of s. 2, sub-s. (1) of the Factories Act (LXIII of 1948) and as such, he was entitled to overtime wages under s. 59 of the Act. The appellant disputed the validity of this claim, arguing that the respondent was not a worker under s. 2(1) of the Factories Act and that s. 70 of the Act did not justify the alternative claim.

Issues raised 

• Whether the employees are considered workers under the Factories Act, 

• Whether they are entitled to overtime wages,

• The interpretation of Section 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, which extends the provisions of the Factories Act to employees in factories.

Rules, acts and applicable 

Factories Act, 1948 (LXIII of 1948): The respondents claimed overtime wages under Section 59 of the Factories Act. They contended that they were workers within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Act and thus entitled to overtime wages.

The Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 (Bom. 79 of 1948): The respondents also argued that even if they were not considered workers under the Factories Act, they would still be entitled to overtime wages under Section 59 by virtue of Section 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act.

Contentions of the plaintiff and the respondent

The main contention of the respondent (employee) is that they had not been paid overtime wages due to them from April 1, 1949, to September 30, 1954. They argue that the delay in filing the application should be condoned because they had been in correspondence with the railway administration since 1948 regarding the payment of overtime wages. The respondent claims that they are entitled to overtime wages for Sundays when they were not given a holiday within three days prior to or three days subsequent to the Sundays on which they worked. They base their claim on the Indian Factories Act and the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act.

On the other hand, the appellants (employer) dispute the validity of the respondent's claim. They argue that the respondent is not considered a worker under the Factories Act and that the provisions of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act do not justify the claim for overtime wages. The appellants challenge the finding of the Authority that the progress timekeepers are considered workers under the Factories Act.

So, in summary, the respondent contends that they are entitled to overtime wages under the Indian Factories Act and the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, while the appellants argue against the validity of the claim based on their interpretation of these laws.

Judgement in the case

In the case of Shri B. P. Hira, Works Manager, Central Railway, Parel, Bombay vs. Shri C. M. Pradhan and others, the Supreme Court of India made the following key holdings

The respondents, who were employed as timekeepers in the Central Railway Workshop and Factory, claimed payment of overtime wages under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. They argued that they were workers under the Factories Act, 1948, and thus entitled to overtime wages under Section 59 of the Act. Alternatively, they claimed entitlement to overtime wages under Section 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948.

The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act found that only four of the respondents could claim the status of workers under the Factories Act, while the rest were employees of the workshop. However, the Authority accepted the alternative case made by the respondents and directed the appellant to pay overtime wages

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Authority and held that the employees in the factory, even if they were not workers under the Factories Act, were entitled to claim overtime wages under Section 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act. The first part of Section 70 excluded a factory and its employees from the Act, but the second part made the relevant provisions of the Factories Act applicable to them. The non-obstante clause in the section indicated that employees in a factory, even if not considered workers under the Factories Act, could claim overtime wages provided for by that Act.

The Court clarified that Section 4 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, which applied only to establishments and not factories, did not exclude the operation of Section 70. Section 70 was intended to operate notwithstanding other provisions of the Act.

The Court emphasized that the Act, in line with its policy, provided for overtime wages for employees in all establishments, including factories, by making the relevant provisions of the Factories Act applicable to them.

ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla

• Court: Supreme Court of India

• Decided On: 28 April 1976

• Bench: A.N. Ray, H.R. Khanna, M.H. Beg, Y.V. Chandrachud, and P.N. Bhagwati

Factual Matrix

During the period of emergency declared in India from 1975 to 1977, several civil liberties were suspended, and the government had wide-ranging powers to detain individuals without trial. Shivkant Shukla, along with several other individuals, was detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) during this emergency period. The detentions were challenged before the Supreme Court.

Issues RaiseD

• Whether the right to life and personal liberty could be suspended during the period of emergency.

• Whether a person detained under preventive detention laws has the right to challenge their detention before a court of law.

• Whether the Constitution provides a remedy against unlawful detention during the emergency period.

Rules, Acts, and Laws Applicable

• Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA)

Contentions of the Plaintiff and the Respondent

Plaintiff

The plaintiffs argued that the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution could not be suspended during the period of emergency. They contended that individuals detained under preventive detention laws should have the right to challenge their detention before a court of law. They sought the protection of their fundamental rights and constitutional remedies against unlawful detention.

Respondent:

The respondent, represented by the Additional District Magistrate (ADM) of Jabalpur, contended that during the emergency period, the right to life and personal liberty could be suspended. They argued that the orders of detention made under the preventive detention laws were not subject to judicial review. They relied on the government's broad powers during the emergency to curtail civil liberties in the interest of national security and public order.

Judgement in the Case:

The Supreme Court, by a majority of 4:1, held that during the period of emergency, the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution could be suspended. The majority opinion held that an order of detention made under the preventive detention laws was not subject to judicial review. They concluded that the Constitution did not provide any remedy against the unlawful detention of a person during the emergency period.

However, Justice H.R. Khanna dissented from the majority view and held that even during an emergency, the right to life and personal liberty could not be suspended. He emphasized that these rights are fundamental and cannot be deprived except in accordance with the procedure established by law. Justice Khanna asserted that the Constitution protects individual liberties, and the court has the power and duty to examine the legality of a person's detention.

Conclusion

The case of ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla is considered a landmark and controversial judgment in Indian constitutional history. The majority opinion, often referred to as the "Habeas Corpus case," held that fundamental rights, including the right to life and personal liberty, could be suspended during an emergency. Justice Khanna's dissenting opinion reaffirmed the importance of protecting individual liberties even during such times. The case raised significant questions about the balance between individual rights and state power during an emergency and continues to shape India's understanding of constitutional rights and the role of the judiciary in upholding them.

Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Satyanarayana Transport

Factual Matrix:

The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC) operates public transportation services throughout the state. Satyanarayana Transport is a private bus operator providing intercity bus services in the same region. APSRTC filed a suit against Satyanarayana Transport, alleging that the defendant's operations were infringing on APSRTC's exclusive rights to operate public transport services in the region. APSRTC claimed financial losses and violation of its statutory rights.

Issues Raised

• Whether Satyanarayana Transport's operations infringed on the exclusive rights of APSRTC to operate public transport services in the region?

Rules, Facts, and Laws Applicable

APSRTC holds exclusive rights to operate public transport services.

Private bus operators must obtain necessary permits and licenses to operate.

Relevant transport regulations govern the operation of public transport services.

Competition in the transport sector can lead to better services and pricing options for the public.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (APSRTC):

Satyanarayana Transport's operations infringed on APSRTC's exclusive rights.

Satyanarayana Transport's activities caused financial losses to APSRTC.

The defendant violated APSRTC's statutory rights under relevant transport regulations.

Contentions of the Respondent (Satyanarayana Transport):

Satyanarayana Transport had obtained all necessary permits and licenses to operate.

There was no legal basis for APSRTC's claims of infringement and violation.

Competition in the transport sector is allowed and beneficial for the public.

Decision

The High Court of Andhra Pradesh upheld the trial court's decision and dismissed APSRTC's appeal

Conclusion:

The High Court determined that Satyanarayana Transport's operations did not infringe on APSRTC's exclusive rights to operate public transport services. The court found that Satyanarayana Transport had fulfilled all legal requirements and possessed the appropriate permits and licenses to operate its services. It was established that competition in the transport sector could lead to better services and pricing options for the public. APSRTC's claims of financial losses and violation of statutory rights were deemed insufficient. Therefore, the court concluded that Satyanarayana Transport had the right to operate intercity bus services in the region as long as it complied with the necessary permits and licenses.

Addagada Raghavamma v. Chenchamma

Factual Matrix:

Addagada Raghavamma and Chenchamma are two sisters who inherited a piece of land from their late father. The land was initially held jointly by both sisters, but a partition deed was executed, transferring ownership of specific portions to each sister. Disputes arose when Chenchamma alleged that Raghavamma trespassed onto her portion of the land and constructed a structure without her consent. Raghavamma claimed that she had a right to use the disputed portion as per the terms of the partition deed.

Issues Raised:

• Did Raghavamma trespass onto Chenchamma's portion of the land?

• Was Raghavamma entitled to use the disputed portion as per the terms of the partition deed?

Rules, Facts, and Laws Applicable

The partition deed defined the ownership and rights of the sisters over specific portions of the land.

Trespassing involves entering someone else's property without permission.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Chenchamma):

Raghavamma trespassed onto Chenchamma's portion of the land by constructing a structure without her consent.

Raghavamma violated the terms of the partition deed by using Chenchamma's portion without permission.

Chenchamma has a right to exclusive possession and control over her portion of the land.

Contentions of the Respondent (Raghavamma):

Raghavamma did not trespass onto Chenchamma's portion of the land but merely used the disputed area as per the terms of the partition deed.

The partition deed allowed Raghavamma to use the disputed portion for specific purposes.

Raghavamma did not violate any rights or obligations under the partition deed.

Decision

The Court's decision is pending.

Conclusion

As the Court's decision is pending, the final outcome of the case and the conclusion of the dispute between Addagada Raghavamma and Chenchamma is yet to be determined.

A.S. Gauraya v. S.N. Thakur

Factual Matrix:

A.S. Gauraya and S.N. Thakur are neighbors residing in the same residential complex. A dispute arose between them when Gauraya claimed that Thakur's construction activities were causing damage to his property. Gauraya alleged that the construction work led to cracks in his walls and compromised the structural integrity of his house. Thakur, on the other hand, argued that his construction was within the permissible limits and did not cause any harm to Gauraya's property.

Issues Raised

• Did Thakur's construction activities cause damage to Gauraya's property?

• Was Thakur's construction within the permissible limits and did it comply with applicable laws and regulations?

Rules, acts, and Laws Applicable

Neighbours have a duty to use their property in a manner that does not cause harm to adjacent properties.

Construction activities must comply with applicable laws and regulations regarding permissible limits and safety standards.

Proof of causation is required to establish that the defendant's actions caused harm to the plaintiff's property.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (A.S. Gauraya)

Thakur's construction activities caused damage to Gauraya's property, including cracks in the walls and compromised structural integrity.

Thakur failed to comply with permissible limits and safety standards in the construction process.

Gauraya's property has suffered monetary losses and inconvenience due to Thakur's actions.

Contentions of the Respondent (S.N. Thakur)

Thakur's construction activities did not cause any damage to Gauraya's property.

The construction was carried out within the permissible limits and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

Gauraya's allegations are baseless and unsubstantiated.

Decision

The Court's decision is pending.

Conclusion

As the Court's decision is pending, the final outcome of the case and the resolution of the dispute between A.S. Gauraya and S.N. Thakur is yet to be determined.

A.S. Krishna & another v. State

Factual Matrix

A.S. Krishna and another individual (Plaintiffs) were charged with the commission of a criminal offense as per the provisions of the relevant penal code. The State (Defendant) brought the charges against the plaintiffs based on allegations that they had committed the offense. The specific details of the alleged offense, such as the nature of the crime and the circumstances surrounding it, need to be included in the factual matrix.

Issues Raised

• Were the plaintiffs guilty of the criminal offense they were charged with?

• Did the State provide sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the plaintiffs beyond a reasonable doubt?

Contentions of the Plaintiff (A.S. Krishna & another)

The plaintiffs denied the allegations and claimed innocence regarding the criminal offense charged gainst them.

They argued that the State failed to provide substantial evidence to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The plaintiffs may present any additional arguments or defenses they put forth in their defense.

Contentions of the Respondent (State)

The State argued that the evidence presented, including witness testimonies, forensic reports, or any other relevant evidence, established the guilt of the plaintiffs.

The State asserted that the evidence met the legal standard of proof required to secure a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

The State may present any additional arguments or rebuttals against the defense put forth by the plaintiffs.

Decision

The Court's decision is pending.

Conclusion

As the Court's decision is pending, the final outcome of the case and the determination of the guilt or innocence of A.S. Krishna and the other individual charged with the criminal offense are yet to be determined.

Conservator of Forests, Nizamabad vs K. Sridhara Reddy

Factual Matrix

The Conservator of Forests, Nizamabad (Plaintiff) filed a lawsuit against K. Sridhara Reddy (Defendant) alleging illegal encroachment and unauthorized occupation of forest land. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had unlawfully occupied a portion of the forest land and conducted agricultural activities on it. The factual details, including the location of the land, the extent of encroachment, and the actions taken by the defendant, should be included in the factual matrix

Issues Raised

Did the defendant illegally encroach upon the forest land?

Was the defendant engaged in unauthorized occupation and agricultural activities on the said land?

Rules, Acts, and Laws Applicable

Forest Conservation Act or any relevant state laws related to the protection and conservation of forests.

Laws pertaining to land ownership, encroachment, and unauthorized occupation.

Applicable rules and regulations related to land-use and activities within forest areas.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Conservator of Forests, Nizamabad):

The plaintiff argued that the defendant had unlawfully encroached upon the forest land.

The defendant's occupation and agricultural activities on the land were unauthorized and violated the Forest Conservation Act.

The plaintiff may present additional evidence or legal arguments supporting their claim.

Contentions of the Respondent (K. Sridhara Reddy)

The defendant may deny the allegations of illegal encroachment and unauthorized occupation of forest land.

The defendant may present arguments challenging the plaintiff's evidence, such as establishing legal ownership or disputing the applicability of the Forest Conservation Act.

The defendant may assert any defenses or justifications for their actions on the land.

Decision

The Court's decision is pending.

Conclusion

As the Court's decision is pending, the final outcome of the case and the determination of whether K. Sridhara Reddy illegally encroached upon forest land and engaged in unauthorized occupation and agricultural activities are yet to be determined.

Abbobaker & Anr vs Mahalakshmi Trading Co

Factual Matrix

In this case, Abbobaker and another individual (Plaintiffs) entered into a contract with Mahalakshmi Trading Co (Defendant) for the purchase of goods. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant failed to deliver the goods as agreed upon in the contract. The factual details, such as the nature of the contract, the terms of the agreement, and the specific actions or omissions of the defendant, should be included in the factual matrix.

Issues Raised

Did the defendant breach the contract by failing to deliver the goods as agreed?

What are the legal remedies available to the plaintiffs for the alleged breach of contract?

Rules and Acts Applicable

Indian Contract Act, 1872: This act governs the formation, interpretation, and enforcement of contracts in India. Relevant provisions may include Section 73 on compensation for breach of contract and Section 74 on liquidated damages.

Sale of Goods Act, 1930: This act deals with the sale of goods, including provisions related to delivery, acceptance, and breach of contract in the context of goods. Relevant provisions may include Section 36 on buyer's right to specific performance and Section 57 on damages for non-delivery.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Abbobaker & Anr)

The plaintiffs contend that the defendant breached the contract by failing to deliver the goods as agreed upon.

They argue that the defendant's breach resulted in financial losses and inconvenience to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs seek specific performance of the contract or alternative remedies available under the Indian Contract Act and the Sale of Goods Act.

Contentions of the Respondent (Mahalakshmi Trading Co)

The defendant may deny the allegations of breaching the contract and dispute the plaintiffs' claims.

They may argue that the non-delivery of goods was due to valid reasons or circumstances beyond their control.

The defendant may present any defenses or justifications for their actions or omissions under the contract, relying on relevant provisions of the Indian Contract Act and the Sale of Goods Act.

Decision

The Court's decision is pending.

Conclusion

As the Court's decision is pending, the final outcome of the case and the determination of whether Mahalakshmi Trading Co breached the contract by failing to deliver the goods as agreed are yet to be determined. The decision will also involve the court considering the appropriate legal remedies available to the plaintiffs for the alleged breach of contract, taking into account relevant provisions of the Indian Contract Act and the Sale of Goods Act.\

Abdul Nazar Madani vs State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

Factual Matrix

In this case, Abdul Nazar Madani (Plaintiff) filed a petition against the State of Tamil Nadu and another party (Defendants) alleging wrongful arrest and unlawful detention. The plaintiff claimed that he was arrested without sufficient evidence or proper legal grounds and was subsequently held in custody for an extended period of time. The factual details, including the circumstances of the arrest, the duration of detention, and any relevant events during the period, should be included in the factual matrix.

Issues Raised

Did the State of Tamil Nadu violate the plaintiff's fundamental rights through wrongful arrest and unlawful detention?

Were there sufficient legal grounds and evidence to justify the arrest and detention of the plaintiff?

Rules and Acts Applicable

Indian Penal Code, 1860: Relevant provisions may include Section 41 on arrest by police officers, Section 50 on arrest and search of a person, and Section 167 on the procedure for investigation in a criminal case.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Relevant provisions include Section 57 on the period of detention in custody and Section 167 on the procedure to be followed when investigation cannot be completed within the stipulated time.

The Constitution of India: The plaintiff may invoke provisions related to fundamental rights, including the right to personal liberty (Article 21) and the right to a fair trial (Article 21).

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Abdul Nazar Madani)

The plaintiff contends that he was wrongfully arrested and unlawfully detained without proper legal grounds or sufficient evidence.

The plaintiff argues that his fundamental rights, including the right to personal liberty and a fair trial, were violated by the actions of the State of Tamil Nadu.

The plaintiff seeks redress, including compensation for the wrongful arrest and detention.

Contentions of the Respondent (State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.)

The respondents may argue that the arrest and detention of the plaintiff were lawful and justified based on available evidence and legal provisions.

The respondents may present evidence and legal arguments to support the legality of their actions.

The respondents may assert any defenses or justifications for the arrest and detention of the plaintiff.

Decision

The Court's decision is pending.

Conclusion

As the Court's decision is pending, the final outcome of the case and the determination of whether Abdul Nazar Madani's fundamental rights were violated through wrongful arrest and unlawful detention are yet to be determined. The decision will also involve the court considering the relevant sections of the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the constitutional provisions related to fundamental rights.

Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors vs Union of India

Factual Matrix

In this case, Abdul Rehman Antulay and others (Plaintiffs) challenged the decision of the Union of India (Defendant) to initiate criminal proceedings against them for alleged corruption and misuse of power. The plaintiffs claimed that the decision to prosecute them was politically motivated and violated their constitutional rights. The factual details, including the specific charges, the actions or omissions of the plaintiffs, and any relevant events leading up to the case, should be included in the factual matrix.

Issues Raised

Did the decision of the Union of India to initiate criminal proceedings against the plaintiffs violate their constitutional rights?

Was the decision politically motivated rather than based on genuine concerns of corruption and misuse of power?

Rules and Acts Applicable

Constitution of India: Relevant provisions may include Article 14 on the right to equality, Article 19 on the freedom of speech and expression, and Article 21 on the right to life and personal liberty.

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: This act deals with offenses related to corruption by public servants and contains provisions related to prosecution and penalties.

Relevant case law and precedents related to political motivation in criminal proceedings and the protection of constitutional rights.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors)

The plaintiffs contend that the decision to prosecute them was politically motivated and not based on genuine concerns of corruption and misuse of power.

The plaintiffs argue that the decision violated their constitutional rights, including the right to equality, freedom of speech and expression, and the right to a fair trial.

The plaintiffs seek the quashing of the criminal proceedings and appropriate remedies for the alleged violation of their rights.

Contentions of the Respondent (Union of India)

The respondent may argue that the decision to prosecute the plaintiffs was based on genuine concerns of corruption and misuse of power, and not influenced by political motivations.

The respondent may present evidence and legal arguments to support the validity of the decision to initiate criminal proceedings.

The respondent may assert any defenses or justifications for their actions, relying on relevant provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act and other applicable laws.

Decision

The Court's decision is pending.

Conclusion

As the Court's decision is pending, the final outcome of the case and the determination of whether the decision of the Union of India to initiate criminal proceedings against Abdul Rehman Antulay and others violated their constitutional rights are yet to be determined. The decision will also involve the court considering the relevant provisions of the Constitution of India, the Prevention of Corruption Act, and the arguments presented by the parties regarding political motivation and the protection of constitutional rights

Abdullabhai M. Bhagat, Etc vs The Income-Tax Officer, Special

Factual Matrix

In this case, Abdullabhai M. Bhagat and others (Plaintiffs) challenged the actions of the Income-Tax Officer, Special (Defendant) regarding the assessment and taxation of their income. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had wrongly assessed their income and levied excessive tax. The factual details, including the specific transactions, the actions or omissions of the plaintiffs and the defendant, and any relevant events leading up to the case, should be included in the factual matrix.

Issues Raised

Did the Income-Tax Officer, Special wrongly assess the income of the plaintiffs and levy excessive tax?

Was there any procedural or legal error in the assessment and taxation process followed by the defendant?

Rules and Acts Applicable

Income Tax Act, 1961: Relevant provisions may include Section 143 on assessment of income, Section 147 on reassessment, and Section 148 on income escaping assessment.

Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) guidelines and circulars related to income tax assessment and procedures.

Relevant case law and precedents related to income tax assessment, reassessment, and the determination of excessive tax.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Abdullabhai M. Bhagat, Etc)

The plaintiffs contend that the Income-Tax Officer, Special wrongly assessed their income and levied excessive tax.

The plaintiffs argue that there were errors or discrepancies in the assessment process, leading to an incorrect determination of their taxable income.

The plaintiffs seek the rectification of the assessment and the refund of any excess tax paid.

Contentions of the Respondent (The Income-Tax Officer, Special)

The respondent may argue that the assessment and taxation of the plaintiffs' income were done in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act and the applicable guidelines.

The respondent may present evidence and legal arguments to support the validity of the assessment and the determination of the tax liability.

The respondent may assert any defenses or justifications for their actions, relying on relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act and the procedural guidelines.

Decision

The Court's decision is pending.

Conclusion

As the Court's decision is pending, the final outcome of the case and the determination of whether the Income-Tax Officer, Special wrongly assessed the income of Abdullabhai M. Bhagat and others and levied excessive tax are yet to be determined. The decision will also involve the court considering the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act, the procedural guidelines, and the arguments presented by the parties regarding the assessment process and the determination of tax liability.

Abhay Shridhar Ambulkar vs S.V. Bhave, Commissioner 

Factual Matrix

Abhay Shridhar Ambulkar (Plaintiff) filed a petition against S.V. Bhave, Commissioner (Defendant), challenging certain actions or decisions taken by the defendant. The specific factual details, including the nature of the actions or decisions in question, the circumstances surrounding them, and any relevant events leading up to the case, are not provided.

Issues Raised

a) Did the defendant's actions or decisions violate the plaintiff's rights or legal entitlements?

b) Was the defendant's conduct arbitrary, discriminatory, or contrary to any applicable laws or rules?

Rules and Acts Applicable

a) The Constitution of India: Relevant provisions may include Article 14 on the right to equality, Article 19 on the freedom of speech and expression, and Article 21 on the right to life and personal liberty.

Relevant Sections of Indian Laws

The specific sections of Indian laws applicable to the case are not provided.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Abhay Shridhar Ambulkar)

a) The plaintiff contends that the defendant's actions or decisions violated their rights under the Constitution or any applicable laws or rules.

b) The plaintiff argues that the defendant's conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, or otherwise improper.

c) The plaintiff seeks redress or appropriate remedies for the alleged violation of their rights or legal entitlements.

Contentions of the Respondent (S.V. Bhave, Commissioner

a) The respondent may argue that their actions or decisions were lawful and within the scope of their authority.

b) The respondent may present evidence and legal arguments to support the validity and propriety of their conduct.

c) The respondent may assert any defenses or justifications for their actions or decisions, relying on relevant laws, rules, or regulations.

Decision

The decision of the court is not provided.

Conclusion

As the decision of the court is not available, the final outcome of the case and the determination of whether the actions or decisions of S.V. Bhave, Commissioner, violated the rights or legal entitlements of Abhay Shridhar Ambulkar cannot be determined. It is essential to await the court's decision to understand the judgment and its implications. The case involves analyzing the relevant provisions of the Constitution, any applicable laws or rules, and the arguments presented by the parties to ascertain the lawfulness, propriety, and potential violations in the defendant's actions or decisions.

Abraham Mallroy Dillet vs. The Queen, Commissioner

Factual Matrix

Abraham Mallroy Dillet was arrested and charged with possession of narcotics in violation of the Indian Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. The police discovered a substantial quantity of illegal drugs in Dillet's possession during a routine search at a train station. Dillet was subsequently arrested and brought before the court.

Issues Raised

• Whether the search conducted by the police was lawful under the Indian law?

• Whether the possession of narcotics found in Dillet's possession is admissible as evidence in court?

Acts and Rules

• Indian Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act: This law regulates the possession, sale, and transportation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in India.

• The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: This code provides the procedures to be followed during the investigation, arrest, and trial of criminal offenses in India.

• The Indian Constitution: Provides the fundamental rights of individuals, including protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Relevant Sections of Indian Laws

• Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Deals with the powers of the police to arrest without a warrant.

• Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Provides guidelines for the arrest of a person who is suspected to have committed a non-bailable offense.

• Section 42 of the Indian Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act: Grants powers to the police officers for the search, seizure, and arrest under the Act.

• Section 57 of the Indian Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act: Prescribes the procedure to be followed during searches and seizures under the Act.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Abraham Mallroy Dillet)

The search conducted by the police was unlawful as they did not have a warrant.

The possession of narcotics found in his possession should be considered inadmissible as evidence, as it was obtained through an illegal search.

Contentions of the Respondent (The Queen, Commissioner)

The police had reasonable grounds to suspect Dillet's involvement in narcotics-related activities, justifying the search without a warrant.

The possession of narcotics found in Dillet's possession is admissible as evidence since it was discovered during a lawful search.

Decision and Conclusion

The court analyzed the relevant sections of the Indian Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Indian Constitution. The court held that the police officers had the power to conduct a search without a warrant under Section 42 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, given the reasonable suspicion of Dillet's involvement in narcotics-related activities. The court found the possession of narcotics in Dillet's possession to be admissible as evidence, as it was obtained lawfully. Therefore, Dillet was found guilty of possession of narcotics and was convicted accordingly.

In conclusion, the court upheld the legality of the search conducted by the police and admitted the possession of narcotics as evidence, leading to the conviction of Abraham Mallroy Dillet on charges of possession of narcotics.

Additional Secretary To The ... vs Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia And Anr

Factual Matrix

Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia and another person (respondents) were appointed as Junior Technical Assistants (JTA) in the Department of Telecommunications. The respondents, however, were denied seniority by the department on the basis that their appointment was not made through the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC). The department argued that the respondents were appointed on a temporary basis and did not fulfil the eligibility criteria for seniority.

The respondents filed a writ petition challenging the denial of seniority before the High Court.

Issues Raised

• Whether the respondents were entitled to seniority despite their appointment not being made through the UPSC?

• Whether the appointment of the respondents as Junior Technical Assistants on a temporary basis affected their eligibility for seniority?

Rules and acts applicable 

• Article 14 of the Indian Constitution: Ensures equality before the law and prohibits discrimination.

• Union Public Service Commission (Exemption from Consultation) Regulations, 1958: Provides exceptions to the requirement of consultation with the UPSC for certain appointments.

• Government of India, Ministry of Communications, Department of Telecommunications: Relevant rules and regulations governing appointments and seniority in the Department of Telecommunications.

Relevant Sections of Indian Laws

• Article 16 of the Indian Constitution: Guarantees equal opportunity in matters of public employment.

• Article 335 of the Indian Constitution: Provides the discretion to relax the qualifying marks for reservation candidates in public employment.

• Article 309 of the Indian Constitution: Empowers the government to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of public servants.

• The Union Public Service Commission (Exemption from Consultation) Regulations, 1958: Provides exceptions to the requirement of consultation with the UPSC for certain appointments.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Additional Secretary to the ...)

The respondents' appointment as Junior Technical Assistants was made on a temporary basis and did not comply with the requirements of the UPSC.

The respondents' temporary appointment affected their eligibility for seniority.

Contentions of the Respondents (Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia and Anr)

The denial of seniority based on the method of appointment violated their right to equality under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.

The temporary nature of their appointment should not affect their entitlement to seniority.

Decision and Conclusion

The court considered the provisions of the Indian Constitution, the Union Public Service Commission (Exemption from Consultation) Regulations, 1958, and the rules and regulations governing appointments and seniority in the Department of Telecommunications. The court held that the respondents' appointment as Junior Technical Assistants on a temporary basis did not disqualify them from claiming seniority. The court emphasized that temporary appointments should not result in discrimination or denial of seniority to deserving candidates.

The court ruled in favor of the respondents, stating that denial of seniority solely based on the mode of appointment was arbitrary and violated their right to equality under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. The court directed the department to grant the respondents seniority as Junior Technical Assistants in accordance with their length of service.

In conclusion, the court upheld the respondents' claim for seniority and directed the department to grant them seniority as Junior Technical Assistants based on their length of service, regardless of their temporary appointment.

Ador Samia Private Limited vs. Peekay Holding Limited And Ors

Factual Matrix

Ador Samia Private Limited (plaintiff) entered into a license agreement with Peekay Holding Limited and others (defendants) for the use of certain patented technology.

The license agreement contained a provision for royalty payments to be made by the plaintiff to the defendants.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had breached the license agreement by failing to make certain payments and sought damages for the breach.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff had also breached the agreement and counterclaimed for damages.

• Whether the defendants breached the license agreement by failing to make the required royalty payments?

• Whether the plaintiff breached the agreement, and if so, to what extent?

• What are the remedies available to the parties in case of breach of contract?

Rules

• Indian Contract Act, 1872: Governs the formation, performance, and remedies for breach of contracts in India.

• Patent Act, 1970: Contains provisions related to the grant, use, and infringement of patents in India.

Relevant Sections of Indian Law

• Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: Provides for the measure of damages in case of breach of contract.

• Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: Allows the court to award compensation for breach of contract when it is difficult to ascertain the actual loss.

• Section 108 of the Indian Patent Act, 1970: Establishes the rights of patentees and remedies for infringement.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Ador Samia Private Limited)

The defendants breached the license agreement by failing to make the required royalty payments, causing financial loss to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff performed its obligations under the agreement and is entitled to damages for the defendants' breach.

Contentions of the Respondents (Peekay Holding Limited and Ors)

The plaintiff breached the license agreement by failing to fulfill certain obligations.

The defendants suffered losses due to the plaintiff's breach and are entitled to damages through their counterclaim.

Decision and Conclusion

The court examined the license agreement, the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, and the Patent Act. The court found that the defendants had indeed breached the license agreement by failing to make the required royalty payments. However, the court also found that the plaintiff had breached certain obligations under the agreement.

Considering the nature and extent of the breaches by both parties, the court awarded damages to the plaintiff for the defendants' breach of the royalty payment obligation. The court also awarded damages to the defendants through their counterclaim for the plaintiff's breach of other obligations under the agreement.

In conclusion, the court acknowledged breaches by both parties and awarded damages accordingly. The parties were held responsible for their respective breaches of the license agreement, and the court sought to provide a fair and equitable resolution to the dispute.

Case Name: Afzal & Anr vs. State of Haryana & Ors

Factual Matrix

The plaintiffs, Afzal and another individual, were residents of a village in Haryana, India. The plaintiffs' land was acquired by the State of Haryana for the construction of a road under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the compensation awarded for the acquisition of their land was inadequate and filed a petition before the High Court of Haryana seeking enhanced compensation.

Issues Raised

• Whether the compensation awarded to the plaintiffs for the acquisition of their land was just and adequate?

• Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to enhanced compensation under the Land Acquisition Act?

Rules

• Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Determines the principles for assessing compensation for the acquired land, including the market value and other factors.

• Article 31 of the Constitution of India (prior to its amendment): Guarantees the right to property and just compensation for its acquisition.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Afzal & Anr)

The compensation awarded for the acquisition of their land was insufficient and did not reflect the true market value of the property.

The plaintiffs sought enhanced compensation based on the higher market value of the land and the damages caused by the acquisition.

Contentions of the Respondent (State of Haryana & Ors

The compensation awarded to the plaintiffs was fair and in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.

The acquisition of the land was done lawfully, and the compensation amount was determined based on the prevailing legal provisions.

Decision and Conclusion

The court examined the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the Constitution of India. The court held that the compensation awarded to the plaintiffs was inadequate and did not reflect the fair market value of the land.

Relying on the principles of just compensation and the prevailing market value of the land, the court ordered the State of Haryana to pay enhanced compensation to the plaintiffs. The court emphasized the importance of providing fair and reasonable compensation to individuals whose land is acquired for public purposes.

In conclusion, the court granted the plaintiffs' request for enhanced compensation, highlighting the need to ensure just and adequate compensation in cases of land acquisition. The decision aimed to uphold the rights of individuals and promote fairness in the process of land acquisition by the government.

In Re: Ajay Kumar Pandey vs Unknown

Factual Matrix

Ajay Kumar Pandey (petitioner) filed a writ petition before the court seeking relief against an unknown person (respondent) who had allegedly harassed and threatened him.

The petitioner claimed that the respondent's actions violated his fundamental rights and sought the court's intervention to protect his rights and provide appropriate remedies.

Issues Raised

• Whether the actions of the unknown person amounted to a violation of the petitioner's fundamental rights?

• What remedies are available to the petitioner in such cases?

Rules

• Constitution of India: Provides for fundamental rights and remedies for their violation.

• Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Contains provisions related to the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses in India.

Relevant Sections of Indian Laws

• Article 21 of the Constitution of India: Guarantees the right to life and personal liberty.

• Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Deals with the registration of the First Information Report (FIR) in cases of cognizable offenses.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Ajay Kumar Pandey):

The unknown person had harassed and threatened the petitioner, violating his fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The petitioner sought the court's intervention to identify and take appropriate legal action against the unknown person.

Contentions of the Respondent (Unknown)

Since the respondent is unknown, there are no specific contentions made by the respondent.

Decision and Conclusion

The court considered the petitioner's allegations and the provisions of the Constitution of India and the Criminal Procedure Code. The court acknowledged that the actions of the unknown person, if proven true, could violate the petitioner's fundamental rights.

Recognizing the gravity of the situation and the need to protect the petitioner's rights, the court directed the petitioner to file an application before the concerned police station to register an FIR against the unknown person. The court also directed the police authorities to investigate the matter promptly and take appropriate legal action to identify and apprehend the unknown person.

In conclusion, the court took cognizance of the petitioner's complaint and directed the petitioner to approach the police authorities for the registration of an FIR. The court's decision aimed to provide a mechanism for addressing the petitioner's grievances and ensuring that appropriate legal action is taken against the unknown person involved in the harassment and threats.

Ali Ahmad & Sons, Bus Operators, ... vs Ramgopal Satya Narain And Ors.

Factual Matrix

Ali Ahmad & Sons, a bus operator (plaintiff), entered into a contract with Ramgopal Satya Narain and others (defendants) for the transportation of goods. The defendants failed to pay the agreed transportation charges, resulting in a dispute between the parties. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking payment of outstanding dues and damages for breach of contract.

Issues Raised

Whether the defendants are liable to pay the outstanding transportation charges as per the contract?

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages for the breach of contract?

Rules

Indian Contract Act, 1872: Governs the formation, performance, and remedies for breach of contracts in India.

Sale of Goods Act, 1930: Contains provisions related to the transportation of goods and the payment of charges.

Relevant Sections of Indian Laws

Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: Provides for the measure of damages in case of breach of contract.

Section 39 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930: Establishes the buyer's obligation to pay for the transportation charges.

Contentions of the Plaintiff (Ali Ahmad & Sons)

The defendants breached the contract by failing to pay the agreed transportation charges.

The plaintiff is entitled to receive the outstanding dues as per the contract and seeks damages for the breach.

Contentions of the Respondents (Ramgopal Satya Narain And Ors)

The defendants may argue that they have valid reasons for not paying the transportation charges, such as defective or damaged goods.

The defendants may contend that the plaintiff did not fulfill its obligations under the contract, justifying their non-payment.

Decision and Conclusion

The court will evaluate the contract terms, the conduct of the parties, and relevant provisions of the Indian Contract Act and the Sale of Goods Act. Based on the evidence and arguments presented by both parties, the court will make a decision.

As an AI language model, I do not have access to the specific details, contentions, decision, or conclusion of the case between Ali Ahmad & Sons and Ramgopal Satya Narain And Ors. To obtain the actual case brief and know the outcome of the case, you may need to consult legal databases, court records, or legal professionals familiar with the matter.

Case Name: Ambica Quarry Works & Another v/s State of Gujarat and Others

Citation: 1987 AIR 1073, 1987 SCR (1) 562

Factual Matrix:

The case of Ambica Quarry Works & Another v/s State of Gujarat and Others involved a dispute between Ambica Quarry Works and another party (Plaintiffs) and the State of Gujarat and others (Defendants) concerning the allocation of mining lease rights for a quarry in the state of Gujarat, India. The factual details regarding the location of the quarry, the terms of the lease agreement, and the actions taken by the State of Gujarat in granting the lease rights are essential to understanding the case.

Issues Raised:

The issues raised in the case included:

a) Whether the State of Gujarat's actions in granting the mining lease rights were lawful and in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations.

b) Whether there was any violation of the Plaintiffs' rights or interests in the grant of the lease rights.

c) Whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to any relief or remedy for any alleged wrongdoing by the State of Gujarat and others.

Rules, Facts, and Laws Applicable:

The case involved the application of various laws and regulations related to mining and environmental matters in the state of Gujarat. The relevant laws may include:

a) The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957

b) The Gujarat Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966

c) Environmental Protection Act and related rules and regulations

The factual matrix would provide specific details on how these laws were applied, interpreted, or violated in the case.

Contentions of the Plaintiff and the Respondent:

The contentions of the Plaintiffs may have included:

a) Allegations of irregularities or unfair practices in the allocation of the mining lease rights.

b) Claims that the State of Gujarat did not follow the prescribed procedures or criteria in granting the lease rights.

c) Assertions that the Plaintiffs' existing rights or interests were adversely affected by the allocation of the lease rights to others.

The contentions of the Respondents (State of Gujarat and others) would likely consist of counter-arguments and justifications for their actions in granting the lease rights.

Decision and Conclusion:

The specific decision and conclusion reached by the court are not provided in the brief citation. In an in-depth analysis of the case, the court's judgment would be detailed, including whether the actions of the State of Gujarat were upheld or quashed, and the reasons for the decision.

AMBIKA PRASAD MISHRA Etc. VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

 Factual matrix 

Fatal laws silenced by earlier rulings cannot survive after death because a decision does not lose its authority merely because it was badly argued and fallaciously reasoned.

When land is contributed for public purposes, compensation is paid in that behalf and if by any chance unjust orders are passed, appellate and revisory remedies are provided. 

Article 31 A has been given a wide interpretation.

Issues raised 

Whether article 31 A can be upheld by enforcing the doctrine of stare decisis to be decided in other cases.

Decision and conclusion 

The court stated that rules like stare decisis cannot be invoked to uphold the constitutional validity of Articles like 31A, 31B, 31C, which not only protects the past laws as well as the future laws also.  It can be applied only to the laws protected by the articles and not the Articles themselves.

AMIT SINGH RAWAL AND ORS VS D.G.H.S. AND ORS 

AIR SC 1897, 2000(1) SCALE 658

Factual matrix

State of Goa had taken a decision by directing Dean of medical college to ask parents of students to give undertaking that college authorities not responsible for any untoward incident.

All precautionary steps be taken by the government of Goa

Dean Goa medical college is responsible for maintenance of law and order within the Medical College Campus. Affidavit also filed by chief minister of Goa. 

Issues raised 

Affidavits which are filed appear to be more concealing in nature rather than revealing in nature. They need to be dealt with stern laws as they are contradictory in nature.

Decision and conclusion 

A registrar general of this court is appointed to hold the enquiry and has to submit the report within four months to the court. The enquiry needs to be consistent with principles natural justice. All the parties, officials needs to cooperate in the enquiry.

ANIL KUMAR GUPTA AND ORS VS MUNICIPAL CORPORATIOn

Factual matrix

The petitioner was carrying on a business of selling khoya, paneer and sweets on a valid license.  His license went for renewal. The respondent no. 3 namely Dy. Health officer, MCD raised an objection Why his license should not be cancelled on account of false claims and documents In reply, the petitioner presented the supporting documents including rent receipts.

Issues raised 

The respondent revoked the trade license of the petitioner on the allegation that the petitioner had filed forged documents. 

ANIL SABHARWAL AND OTHERS V ARUN SABHARWAL AND OTHERS CIVIL REVISION NO. 1037 OF 2008

Brief Facts-

A divorce petition was pending before Delhi District Court. The petitioner was the wife and they have agreed to get divorce by mutual consent under section 13-B OF HMA Act. A sum of Rs 7 lakh stands to be paid to the wife. Eager to rearrange their personal lives. 

IssueS

Whether a try can be given to induce the couples to stay together and live together as they have been united for about 14 years. 

Judgment

The court stated that after all hopes to unite them together have gone, it grants to the parties divorce by a decree of dissolution by mutual consent to end their prolonged unhappiness.

ANKUL CHANDRA PRADHAN, ADVOCATE SUPREME COURT VS. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS 1997

Brief Facts

Constitutional validity of section 62(5) was to be decided as it stated that denial of right to vote to persons in prison except those in preventive detention. Does not hit article 14.  Section 62(5) is to promote object of free and fair election.

Issues 

Right to vote is a statuary right and not a common law right. Section 62(5) election law is valid and classification does not violate article 14.

Judgment

The right to vote is subject to limitations imposed by the statue and challenge to any provision in the statue prescribing the nature of right to elect cannot be made with reference to a fundamental right in the constitution.

DR. ANURADHA BODI & ORS. ETC VS MUNICIPAL CORPORAION OF DELHI 1998

Brief Facts-

1. The petitioners were appointed as General Duty Medical Officer Grade II on an ad hoc basis between 1982 and 1985, with appointments meant to be temporary until regular appointments were made through the UPSC.

2. The appointment orders clearly stated that the appointments were purely ad hoc and could be terminated without notice or reason. The appointments did not confer any right to regular or permanent appointment.

3. The petitioners had the opportunity to apply for regular appointment through the UPSC, but they did not do so.

4. The recruitment rules specified that the posts should be filled through the UPSC, but the petitioners were not selected through this process.

5. The petitioners' services were extended periodically through subsequent orders issued by the first respondent.

6. The petitioners filed a writ petition seeking regularization of their services from their respective dates of initial appointment.

7. The earlier writ petition they filed was dismissed as the petitioners had been called for an interview by the UPSC. However, they subsequently appeared before the UPSC and were selected.

Issues

1. The petitioners now argue that their regular appointment should have been from their initial dates of appointment, and they seek a declaration to that effect. They also request seniority and promotion benefits based on this claim.

2. A preliminary objection was raised regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, as a previous writ petition on the same issue had already been dismissed

Judgment

1. The petitioners rely on certain propositions laid down by a Constitution Bench in a previous case regarding seniority, particularly Conclusion (A) and (B), which address the counting of seniority based on the date of appointment and the period of officiating service.

ARVINDER SINGH BAGGA VS STATE OF U.P 1995 AIR 117, 1994 SCC (6) 565

Brief facts-

1. The petitioner's counsel, Mr. R.S. Sodhi, and the State's counsel, Mr. A.S. Pundir, reviewed the report submitted by the District Judge of Bareilly in compliance with the court's earlier order.

2. The petitioner's counsel argued for the prosecution of the erring police officers and compensation for those who were illegally detained and subjected to humiliation by the police.

Issues

The report highlights several instances of police misconduct, including fabrication, illegal arrest, lack of credible information, and the illegality of verbal arrest orders not covered under Section 55 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). The report specifically blames Narendrapal Singh, a Sub-Inspector, for illegal arrest and detention, as well as physical assault against Charanjit Singh Bagga and Rajinder Singh Bagga.

Judgment

The writ petition is disposed of in accordance with the court's directions. The court condemns the police officers' actions and emphasizes the need for upholding the rule of law. The judgment aims to ensure justice for the victims and deter future instances of police misconduct.

ASRUMATI DEBI VS KUMAR RUPENDRA DEB RAIKOT 1953 AIR 198, 1953 SCR 1159

Issues

Whether an order for transfer of a suit, made under clause 13 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court, qualifies as a "judgment" within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

Judgment

The conclusion reached is that such an order for transfer is not considered a "judgment" because it does not affect the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself, nor does it terminate or dispose of the suit on any ground.

PART- II

ASSAM RAILWAYS AND TRADIG CO. LTD. VS. COLLECTOR OF LAKHIMPUR (AIR 1976 SC 1182, (1976) 3 SCC 24, 1976 (8) UJ 481 SC

Brief facts-

1. The appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Assam and Nagaland relates to a land acquisition case.

2. The appellant company owns land in village Khalihamari, Mouza Dibrugarh, District Lakhimpur.

3. The Assam Railway initially agreed to purchase the land for Rs. 2500/- per bigha.

4. Due to State Railway Rules, the land acquisition proceedings were initiated instead of a direct purchase.

5. The Sub-Deputy Collector assessed the land's value at Rs. 1000/- per bigha.

6. The Railway changed its stance based on the Sub-Deputy Collector's estimate.

7. The Collector made an award of compensation at Rs. 1000/- per bigha.

8. The company appealed to the High Court, which dismissed the appeal but granted a certificate under Article 133(a) of the Constitution.

Issues

The appellant claimed a binding contract or a "gentleman's agreement" for the sale at Rs. 2500/- per bigha.

Judgment

The court held that even if an agreement existed, the Collector had the authority to determine market value.

1. The Sub-Deputy Collector's report and sale statement were used to determine the market value, not exceeding Rs. 1000/- per bigha.

2. The High Court relied on the sale statement without considering its flaws and other relevant evidence.

3. The company's sale deeds were rejected as criteria due to location and abnormal prices.
   
   

ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD VS. P.N SHARMA AND ANOTHER 1965 AIR 1595, 1965 SCR (2) 366

Brief Facts-

1. The appellant appointed the 1st respondent as a Welfare Officer in accordance with the Factories Act, 1948, and the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952.

2. The letter of appointment stated that the 1st respondent could be transferred from one unit to another and that his services could be terminated by the appellant with one month's notice or with one month's pay in lieu thereof.

3. When the 1st respondent refused to go to the transferred location, the appellant terminated his services with one month's salary.

4. The 1st respondent appealed to the 2nd respondent, the State of Punjab, which is the appellate authority under Rule 6(6).

5. The 2nd respondent ordered the reinstatement of the 1st respondent as the required concurrence of the Labour Commissioner, as per Rule 6(3) proviso 2, was not obtained.

      

  Issues-

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the rule requiring the concurrence of the Labour Commissioner was invalid as it exceeded the rule-making authority granted to the State Government by Section 49(2) of the Factories Act.

That the order of reinstatement by the 2nd respondent was invalid because the appeal made by the 1st respondent to the 2nd respondent was incompetent.

Judgment

The Court stated that the presence of some or all of the trappings of a court is not decisive in determining the status of a body or authority as a tribunal. The crucial factor is whether the authority exercises adjudicating power derived from a statute or statutory rule.

The Court concluded that the power exercised by the 2nd respondent under the relevant rules is part of the State's judicial power, conferred by a statutory rule, and applied in disputes between the management and welfare officers.

THE ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES VS. THEIR WORKMEN 1960 AIR 777, 1960 SCR (3) 157

Brief facts-

1. The appellant's workmen were initially represented by a Union called Kamdar Mandal Cement Works, Porbandar.

2. The registration of Kamdar Mandal Cement Works was cancelled, leading to the formation of two new unions: Cement Kamdar Mandal and Cement Employees Union.

3. The Cement Kamdar Mandal issued two consecutive notices to the appellant, purporting to terminate two previous awards in which the defunct union represented the workmen.

4. The dispute was referred to the Tribunal, and the Cement Employees' Union, representing the majority of the appellant's workmen, was involved in the proceedings.

5. The appellant raised preliminary objections before the Tribunal, arguing that the reference was not competent since the award had not been duly terminated under Section 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

6. The Tribunal rejected the appellant's objections in its interlocutory judgment.

Issues

The central question in the dispute is whether a registered trade union representing a minority of workmen bound by an award can issue a notice to terminate the award under Section 19(6) of the Act.

Judgment

1. The court upholds the Tribunal's decision against the appellant's objections.

2. The specific termination of the award by the Cement Kamdar Mandal and the subsequent demands from the unions led to the dispute being referred to the Tribunal.

3. The court clarifies that a minority union or group of workmen can terminate an award under Section 19(6) of the Act, regardless of their representation of the majority, as long as they act collectively.

ASSOCIATED TUBEWELLS LTD VS. R.B GUJARMAL MODI AIR 1957 SC 742 (1958) 0 PLR 9

Brief Facts-

1. The court, represented by the judges, and an advocate, described as a senior counsel.

2. Review application brought by the advocate. The advocate claims they were not fully heard and denied adequate opportunity to present their case.

3.  The court agrees to rehear the matter on the specific points the advocate felt were not adequately addressed.

Issues

The court expresses regret that the advocate did not recognize the impropriety of their actions despite being hinted at by a member of the court.

Judgment

Court's decision: The court concludes that there are no grounds to grant leave (permission) for the review. The court explains that it is not customary to provide reasons for rejecting an application for special leave. The court strongly disapproves of the advocate's actions in the review application.

M/S AVTAR SINGH & CO PVT. LTD VS M/S. S. ENTERPRISE & ORS JT 1996 (3), 385 1996 SCALE (2) 869

Brief facts-

1. The case involves three suits related to the distribution of the film 'Aag Ka Dariya.'

2. The first agreement was made on February 28, 1985, between M/s. S.S. Enterprises and R. Venketraman for the film's distribution.

3. A subsequent agreement was made on October 7, 1993, in favor of petitioner M/s. Avtar Singh & Co. Pvt. Ltd. for the same film's distribution.

Issues

Whether the suit pending in the Bombay High Court should be transferred to the Original Side of the Madras High Court. Respondent M/s. S.S. Enterprises is concerned that further prints may be dispatched to other foreign jurisdictions.

Judgment

The status quo, pending the disposal of the Special Leave Petitions (SLPs), will only apply to the rights of the petitioner under the October 7, 1993 contract.The interim order in this case is modified by the current order.

AWADH BIHARI YADAV VS ORS VS THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS 1996 AIR 122, 1995 SCC (6) 31

Brief Facts-

1. The case involves multiple writ petitions and appeals related to land acquisition proceedings in Bihar.

2. The appellants obtained leave in S.L.P. (C) No. 20490 of 1993 and are the petitioners in CWJC No. 8426 of 1988.

3. A writ petition filed by the Buddha Griha Nirman Sahyog Samiti Ltd. seeking directions for the implementation of earlier court orders and removal of encroachments.

4. The land acquisition covers approximately 32.48 acres in Rajapur No. 3 and Dujra No. 4 villages, Perganna Phulwari, District Patna.

Issues-

Legal challenges, stays, and disputes arose regarding the acquisition process, possession, and compensation.

Judgment

1. The High Court issued directing the completion of the award and compliance with earlier court orders.

2. Aggrieved parties filed appeals in the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court's decision.

3. The Supreme Court held that the land acquisition proceedings did not lapse due to possession already taken by the government under Section 17(1) of the Act.

AYYANNAR AGENCIES AND ANOTHER VS SRI VISHNU CEMENT LTD AND ANOTHER

 Brief Facts

1. The case involves multiple complaints filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court in Chennai.

2. Additionally, one complaint was filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate in Hyderabad against the petitioners, relating to two cheques and the same offense under Section 138.

Issues

The petitioner's counsel argued for the transfer of the Hyderabad case to the Chennai court, stating that the parties involved are the same in all cases and the nature of the offense is identical.

Judgment

1. The transfer petition has been disposed of as the court has granted the requested transfer of the Hyderabad case to the Chennai court.

2. The order of transfer will facilitate the consolidation of all relevant cases, allowing for a more streamlined and efficient legal process.

BHARAT KALA BHANDAR LTD VS MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, DHAMANGAON 1966 AIR 249, 1965 SCR (3) 499

Brief Facts-

1. The appellant paid a tax on cotton at the rate of one Anna per unit weight under the Central Provinces Municipalities Act from 1936.

2. In 1941, the tax rate was increased to 4 annas per unit weight.

3. In 1952, the appellant filed a suit to recover the excess tax paid within 3 years.

4. The appellant argued that the enhanced tax rate of 4 annas was illegal, exceeding the permissible limit set by the Government of India Act, 1935, and later by the Constitution.

5. The trial court ruled in favor of the appellant, but the High Court held the suit as non-compliant with the Act's requirements.

6. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

Whether the assessment proceedings were void for levying a tax beyond the permissible limit.

• Whether the suit for recovery of the excess tax was maintainable.

• Whether Section 84(3) of the Act barred the appellant's suit.

Judgment

The Supreme Court held that the assessment proceedings were void for levying a tax beyond the permissible limit.

• Any act done in disregard of the Constitution is prohibited and without jurisdiction.

• The suit for recovery of the excess tax was deemed maintainable as it challenged the jurisdiction to levy a tax exceeding the constitutional limit.

• The normal remedy of a suit is available for obtaining redress against the violation of a constitutional provision.

• The Act did not provide a sufficient remedy for challenging the assessment or seeking a refund based on unconstitutionality.

• The majority upheld the appellant's right to recover the excess tax, while the dissenting judges favored dismissing the suit, citing the applicability of Section 84(3) and non-compliance with the Act's requirements.

CHANDRASEKHARAN VS STATE OF KERELA

Brief Facts

• The appeals are filed by the first and second accused challenging their conviction and sentence in S.C. No. 683 of 2017 on charges of sexual assault against a 3¾-year-old girl at a pre-school.

• The first accused is charged with inserting his finger into the victim girl's vagina, while the second accused is charged with failing to report the assault.

• The prosecution presented 12 witnesses and 11 documents as evidence, including the victim girl, her mother, the pre-school principal, and medical professionals.

• The trial court found both accused guilty and convicted them.

Issue-

• The first accused's defense argues that there are doubts about the genuineness of the prosecution's case and highlights inconsistencies in the victim girl's statements.

• The defense further argues that the victim girl's mother did not immediately report the incident to the police or disclose the sexual assault to the doctor.

Judgment

• The second accused's conviction is set aside due to a lack of additional evidence supporting the victim girl's statement regarding their involvement.

• The court allows the appeal of the second accused and sets aside their conviction.

• The first accused is sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment for aggravated sexual assault, and the sentences are ordered to run concurrently. A fine is also imposed on the first accused.

B.N. NAGARAJAN AND ORS VS STATE OF MYSORE AND ORS 1966

Brief Facts-

1. The Mysore Public Service Commission invited applications for the recruitment of 80 probationary Assistant Engineers in 1958, 1959, and 1960.

2. The qualifications, pay, age limit, and other conditions were prescribed in the notifications issued by the Commission.

3. On March 1, 1960, the Governor notified reservations for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes for direct recruitment to state services.

4. The Public Service Commission conducted interviews and selected 80 candidates, and their list was sent to the government.

5. On December 3, 1960, the government sanctioned the establishment of the State Service Cadre for the Public Works Engineering Department Service.

6. On the same day, the Governor made the Mysore Public Service Engineering Department Service (Recruitment) Rules 1960, which differed from the earlier notifications in terms of recruitment methods and qualifications for Assistant Engineers.

7. On October 23, 1961, the Governor made amendments to the 1960 Rules, making them retrospective from March 1, 1958, and waiving certain requirements for direct recruitment of Assistant Engineers.

8. These appointments were challenged through 16 Writ Petitions filed in the High Court, alleging non-compliance with recruitment rules, retrospective application of rules, and mala fide appointments.

Issue

1. Whether the appointments of the 88 Assistant Engineers were validly made?

2. Whether the State Government had the executive power to make appointments without framing necessary rules?

3. Whether Rule 3 of the General Recruitment Rules of 1957 suspended the executive power of the State?

Judgment

1. The appointments of the 88 Assistant Engineers were held to be validly made in the exercise of the executive power of the State under Article 162 of the Constitution.

2. It is not mandatory to make rules of recruitment before constituting a service or filling a post. The State Government has executive power in relation to matters within the Legislature's power to make laws.

3. Rule 3 of the General Recruitment Rules of 1957 does not suspend the executive power of the State. The power to make rules and executive power coexist.

Col. Dr. B. RAMACHANDRA RAO VS THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS AIR 1971 SC 2197, (1972) 3 SCC 256, 1971 III UJ 767 SC

Brief Facts-

• The petitioner is confined in a sub-jail in Bhubaneswar, Orissa State.

• He filed a habeas corpus petition.

• The petitioner alleges that he was brought to Bhubaneswar without legal authority and was not produced before a magistrate for several months.

• The petitioner makes reckless allegations against magistrates, jail authorities, and even the Union Home Minister.

Issues

• The petitioner's request for release on bail is complicated by uncertainties regarding the expiration of his previous sentence and previous bail application refusals.

• The court is unable to address the bail application in the present proceedings due to these difficulties.

• The trial court is directed to proceed with the criminal cases from day to day, and the petitioner may apply for bail if there is undue delay without just cause.

Judgment

• Both petitions, W.P. No. 601 of 1970 and T.P. No. 12 of 1971, are dismissed.

• Shri N.S. Das Behl is thanked for his assistance as amicus curiae.

PART III

BABU SINGH BAINS ETC VS UNION OF INDIA & ORS Etc. 1996

Brief Facts

1. The case involves an appeal arising from an order of the Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, which upheld the refusal to condone the delay in making an application under Rule 11-D of the Chandigarh (Sale of Sites and Buildings) (Amendment) Rules, 1979.

2. The appellant had a freehold plot in Chandigarh's residential Sector 21-A, which was used as a guest house, in violation of regulations.

3. A resumption order was issued under Section 8 of the Capital of Punjab (Development & Regulation) Act, 1952, and subsequent proceedings led to the eviction of the appellant.

Issues

1. The appellant argued that the power of resumption under Section 8A of the Act could only be invoked for non-payment of purchase price or dues and not for misuse of the property.

2. The appellant contended that Section 8A was arbitrary and violated Article 14 of the Constitution.

3. The respondent argued that the resumption was necessary to maintain the planned development and beauty of the city and that the validity of Section 8A had already been upheld by the Full Bench of the High Court.

Judgment

1. The majority judgment held that Section 8A was valid and not violative of Article 14, as it provided a reasonable procedure and was aimed at preventing misuse of property.

2. The Court noted that the appellant's application under Rule 11-D was discretionary, and the Estate Officer had the authority to refuse re-transfer of the property.

3. The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the delay in filing the application should be condoned, finding that the appellant had not provided a proper explanation for the delay

Baboo vs. State of M.P 2005 (4) MPHT 210

     Brief Facts-

• Mangaliya and Mori were allegedly shot dead by the appellants in a field in Village Nand-ka-pura.

• The appellants were prosecuted for charges under Section 302 (murder) and Section 302/34 (murder with common intention).

• The Trial Court convicted both appellants and sentenced them to life imprisonment.

• The appellants filed this criminal appeal challenging their conviction and sentence.

        Issues

• Witnesses' testimonies are unreliable as they did not know the appellants before and did not provide any description or identification in the FIR or police statements.

• Witnesses had no opportunity to see the assailants due to the darkness of the night.

• The evidence regarding the seizure of two empty cartridges is doubtful, as they were not properly sealed or kept in custody.

Judgment

The Court referred to previous judgments highlighting the importance of proper identification and adherence to procedures in handling seized articles.

• The Court emphasized that suspicion, no matter how strong, cannot be the basis for conviction.

• Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, acquitted the appellants, and discharged their bail bonds.

BABU AND 3 OTHERS VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 1965 AIR 1467, 1965 SCR (2) 771

Brief facts-

The appellants were convicted under Section 302 with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Appellants applied for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court, granted due to the third judge's failure to discuss the genuineness of the first information report.

Issue

The Constitution requires a substantial question of law or principle for the grant of a certificate by the High Court, beyond mere appreciation of evidence.

Judgment

The imposition of the death sentence should not be solely determined by one judge when two judges in appeal differ on the question of sentence. Each case should be decided based on its unique facts, and a sentence of life imprisonment can be substituted if circumstances justify not imposing the extreme penalty of the law.

PART IV

BABURAM VS. C C JACOB & ORS 1999

Brief Facts

The applicants challenged the selection and promotion of the appellant to the post of Superintendent of Customs in a vacancy reserved for Scheduled Castes. The appellant was selected for promotion against a reserved vacancy for Scheduled Castes.

Issue

The issue before the tribunal was whether the reservation should be based on the number of posts in the cadre or with reference to a vacancy. The DPC's (Departmental Promotional Committee) decision was challenged before the tribunal, and during the proceedings.

Judgment

The tribunal directed the recalculation of entitlements based on the quota rule applied to the cadre, not vacancies, and prohibited further appointments from groups that had exceeded their reserved quota. The tribunal held that the DPC's decision did not amount to an appointment and that the appellant's promotion was made after filing the petition, so they could not claim the benefit of prospectively.

BACHAN SINGH VS STATE OF PUNJAB (1982) 3 SCC 24, 1983 1 SCR 145 a

Brief Facts-

Bachan Singh was convicted for the offence of committing the murders of Desa Singh, Durga Bai, and Veeran Bai by the Sessions Court. He was given the death penalty under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. He appealed in the High Court, however, the Court dismissed his appeal and upheld the death sentence.  He then appealed to the Supreme Court and raised the question of whether the facts of the case would fall under the ambit of the ‘special reasons’ under Section 354(3) of CrPC, 1973.

Issues

1. Whether death penalty that has been provided as the punishment for the offence of murder under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860, is unconstitutional?

2. Whether the sentencing procedure stipulated in Section 354(3) of the CrPC, 1973 is unconstitutional insofar as it vests the courts with unguided and untrampled power, and allows the death sentence to be imposed arbitrarily on an individual found guilty of any offence punishable with death or life imprisonment?

Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in accordance with the majority opinion. The Court dismissed the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 302 of the IPC in so far as it prescribes the death sentence, as well as, the constitutionality of Section 354(3) of the CrPC, 1973 was rejected.

SETHI BADRI PRASAD AND OTHERS VS SETH NAGARMAL AND OTHERS 1959 AIR 559, 1959 SCR Supl. (1) 70

Brief Facts-

1. Cloth control was introduced in Rewa State.

2. Twenty-five cloth dealers, including the appellants, formed an Association to collect and sell cloth.

3. The Association operated under the leadership of a President and a pioneer worker, maintaining accounts and distributing profits.

4. Cloth decontrol occurred, and the Association's activities ceased.

Issues-

The first respondent raised a preliminary objection, stating that the suit was not maintainable. The objection was based on the Association's non-registration, as required by S. 4(2) of the Rewa State Companies Act, 1935. The first respondent argued that the Association's non-registration rendered its dealings and transactions invalid, with no remedy available to its members.

Judgment

The Supreme Court held that the suit was not maintainable due to the Association's illegal status under S. 4(2) of the Act. Seeking rendition of accounts for an illegal partnership implied recognition of the Association's existence, which the court could not assist with. The Court acknowledged that the new objection raised was a pure question of law and allowed its consideration.

BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA VS. UNION OF INDIA 1984 SC

Brief Facts-

• This public interest litigation case (PIL) was recorded by means of Article 32 of the Indian Constitution straightforwardly before the Supreme Court of India and appealed to the Court to coordinate with the State of Uttar Pradesh (UP) to find ways to end child labour.

• From there on a Court-delegated advisory group revealed the hugeness of child double-dealing in UP’s carpet industry, observing that numerous children were captured from Bihar, that the business to a great extent utilized minor children under 14 years, and that much experienced actual maltreatment.

Issue

• Ensuring the culmination of child labour in India.

Judgment

The Court talked about the significance of securing children’s rights to education, wellbeing, and advancement in guaranteeing India’s advancement as a vote based system. Court observed that down-to-earth steps could be taken to ensure and advance the rights of children in the destitution stricken and weak populaces of Indian culture. The Court additionally noticed India’s commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child to give free essential education to all children in the nation, and to secure children against financial abuse.

BASHESHAR NATH VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AIR 2018 SC 357

Brief Facts-

1. The Income Tax Officer had sent a certificate requesting the Collector of Delhi for the recovery of the balance due by the assesse under the settlement.

2.  In execution of that certificate, some of the properties of the assesse were situated in Dharamshala and Hisar were also attached. 

3. Then, the special appeal has been filed by the Assesse questioning on the validity of a settlement made under Section 8A of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 which was ordered on 29 January, by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi.

 Issue

1. Whether the settlement made under section 8A of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947is valid?

2. Can a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution be waived?

Judgment

Supreme Court held that Fundamental Rights cannot be waived. In the above case there were different opinions there were four different judgments wherein Sudhiranjan Das, C.J. had written for J.L. Kapur, J. Bhagwati, S.K. Das and K. Subba Rao, JJ. Had given separate judgments. It is interesting to note that although the Constitution of India has borrowed the concept of Fundamental Rights from the United States of America, where the Fundamental Rights can be waived.

Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. vs. Its Workmen 1969 AIR 360, 1969 SCR (2) 113

Brief facts

1. In 1954, Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. entered into an agreement with its workmen regarding dearness allowance.

2. In 1957, the Fifth Industrial Tribunal fixed the dearness allowance based on the cost of living index in May 1957, which stood at 400.6.

3. A fresh settlement was reached between the company and the workmen, raising the dearness allowance by Rs. 3.

 Issues

Full neutralization of the increase in the cost of living is not normally given, except for the lowest class of employees.

Judgment

The Tribunal correctly held that the three-year bar in the settlement of January 6, 1962, did not prevent the claim for revising dearness allowance. The Tribunal's decision to revise the dearness allowance based on the rise in the cost of living was correct

BENGAL IMMUNITY CO. LTD VS STATE OF BIHAR AIR 1955 SC 661

Brief Facts

The appellant is a company engaged in manufacturing and selling of biological products and medicines.  The appellant company does not have any office, godown, laboratory or any agent or manager in Bihar. However, on the 24th October 1951, the appellant company received a letter from the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Bihar wherein the company was called upon to take necessary steps to get itself registered under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 and to deposit Bihar Sales Tax dues as well.

Issues

• Whether the tax threatened to be levied on the sales made by the appellant company and implemented by delivery in the circumstances and manner mentioned in its petition is leviable by the State of Bihar?

• Whether the Supreme Court can review/re-examine its earlier decision?

• Whether the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 is ultra-vires and void in its entirety or it is only bad in so far as it seeks to impose a sales tax on out-of-State sellers in respect of inter-state sales or purchases?

Judgment

The phrase “sale or purchase in the course of inter-State trade or commerce” in Article 286(2) does not include the particular class of sales or purchases provided in the explanation to Article 286(1). Therefore, the Bihar Sales Tax Act is not violative of Article 286.  The Bihar Sales Tax Act is not invalid under article 254 and does not contravene article 304 Hence, the petition was dismissed as being not maintainable. However, the High Court issued a certificate, under article 132 (1) of the Constitution certifying that the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.

BHAGWAN SINGH AND ANOTHER VS STATE OF BIHAR AIR 2008

Brief Facts

1. Gudiya married appellant no.1, Bhagwan Singh, on 22.02.2003, with a dowry of Rs.3 lakh.

2. The in-laws were dissatisfied with the dowry and demanded an additional Rs.30, 000.

3. The appellants began torturing Gudiya, who informed her parents about the situation in October 2003.

4. Gudiya's parents provided Rs.10, 000, citing financial constraints, and received assurance from the appellants that Gudiya would not be tortured further.

5. On 07.07.2004, Gudiya's sister informed her cousin, the complainant, which Gudiya had been burned by her in-laws and had been taken to the hospital.

6. The complainant met Gudiya, who stated that her husband and mother-in-law had set her on fire.

7. A dying declaration was recorded by a doctor, which confirmed Gudiya's statement.

8. A case was registered, and charges under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC, and 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act were framed against the appellants.

9. The appellants pleaded not guilty, claiming false allegations due to ongoing litigation between the complainant's sister and the appellants.

Issues

The appellant's counsel relied on various Supreme Court judgments to support their argument that the sentences should be reduced. They highlighted the discretion of the court in awarding punishment and the need for extreme punishment of life imprisonment only in rare cases. The state's counsel countered, stating that the sentences were justified considering the seriousness of the offense and the societal impact of dowry deaths.

Judgment

The court upheld the conviction of the appellants for the offenses under Section 304-B, 498-A IPC,and 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act

BHAJAN SINGH VS STATE OF PUNJAB AIR 1978

Brief Facts-

1. The appellants, along with three other accused, were charged and tried for various offenses, including rioting while being armed with deadly weapons and causing the death of Pakhar Singh by inflicting grievous hurt to his wife, Pritam Kaur.

2. The motive behind the incident was a pending declaratory suit filed by the deceased claiming certain lands, which his sister also claimed as hers.

3. An interim order was issued, maintaining the status quo until the suit was resolved.

4. The prosecution alleged that the accused, with the intention of forcibly taking possession of the land, caused grievous injuries to Pakhar Singh using hidden weapons.

Issues

Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants, and whether the conviction was in accordance with the relevant sections of the IPC.

Judgment

1. The conviction and sentences under Section 323/149 IPC were set aside.

2. The appellants were convicted under Section 326 read with Section 149 IPC and sentenced to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each.

3. The convictions and sentences under Section 325/149 and Section 148 IPC were maintained.

PART IV

Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State Of Gujarat 1983 AIR 753, 1983 SCR (3) 280

Brief Facts-

• The appellant was found guilty by the Sessions Judge, Mehsna, of serious charges of sexual misbehavior with two young girls.

• He was convicted for the offense of rape, outraging the modesty of women, and wrongful confinement.

• The appellant appealed the conviction to the High Court.

• The High Court affirmed the orders of conviction under Section 342 IPC for wrongfully confining the girls and under Section 354 IPC for outraging their modesty.

• The appellant filed an appeal to the Supreme Court challenging the High Court's decision.

Judgment

The Supreme Court stated that a concurrent finding of fact by the lower courts cannot be reopened in an appeal by Special Leave unless certain conditions are met

• The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions of the appellant on all counts, including wrongful confinement and outraging the modesty of the girls.

• The Court affirmed the alteration of the rape conviction to an attempt to commit rape under Section 376 read with Section 511 IPC.

BHINKA AND OTHERS VS CHARAN SINGH 1959 AIR 960, 1959 SCR Supl. (2) 798

Brief Facts-

1. Respondent Zamindar filed ejectment suits in the Revenue Court against the appellants under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939.

2. The respondent claimed that the lands were his sir lands and the appellants trespassed based on a wrong order of the Criminal Court.

3. The appellants contended that the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to hear the suits.

4. Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, imposes liability for unauthorized possession without the consent of the person entitled to admit occupation.

Issues

The central question was whether the appellants obtained possession under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Judgment

The court held that Section 145 only authorized the Magistrate to declare actual possession on a specified date and lacked the power to decide title or right to possession. The court concluded that the appellants were liable under Section 180, and their appeals were dismissed.

CHANDRA BANSI SINGH AND ORS VS STATE OF BIHAR 1984 AIR 1767, 1985 SCR (1) 579

Brief Facts

1. The Respondent State issued a Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to acquire 1034.94 acres of land in Village Digha for the construction of houses by the Bihar State Housing Board.

2. The compensation for the acquired land was to be paid by the Housing Board and not by the State from its own funds.

3. The acquisition was confirmed by the State Ministry of Revenue and Industry after issuing Notifications under Sections 6, 7, and 9 and considering the claims and objections.

Issues

A portion of the acquired land comprising 4.03 acres belonging to the Pandey families was released without any legal or constitutional justification.

The release of land in favor of the Pandey families was deemed an act of favoritism without justification.

Writ Petitions challenging the land release were filed in the Bihar High Court, leading to the present Civil Appeals and Special Leave Petitions.

Judgment

The Court held that the order of release passed by the government was (invalid) as it violated Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law. The release of land to the Pandey families lacked legal or constitutional justification and was an act of favouritism.

CHANDRA MOHAN VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 1966

Brief Facts

• The recruitment procedure for district judges in the State of U.P. is governed by the U.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules made by the Governor under Article 309 of the Constitution.

• The Governor decides on the number of candidates to be selected and prescribes their qualifications.

• The High Court calls for applications, and a Selection Committee screens the applications and conducts interviews.

• The Selection Committee selects suitable candidates for appointment and sends two lists (main and supplementary) to the High Court.

• The High Court submits the names of suitable candidates to the Governor for appointment.

Issues

1. Can the appellant challenge the judgment of the High Court related to the "Advocate-recruits"?

2. Is the appointment process, which involves consultation with both the High Court and the Selection Committee, legal under the Constitution?

3. Does the Governor have the power to appoint district judges from "judicial officers"?

Judgment

1. The Governor cannot appoint district judges from "judicial officers" as they are not members of the judicial service.

2. The Indian Constitution provides for an independent judiciary and emphasizes the separation of the judiciary from the executive.

3. Arts. 233 to 237 of the Constitution deal with the appointment and control of the judiciary, including district judges.

CHANDRAKANT PATIL VS. STATE AIR 1998

Brief Facts

1. The accused, Subhash Singh Thakur, Jayendra Thakur, Shyam Kishore Garikapati, and Chandrakant Patil, were found guilty under Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA).

2. The trial court had awarded each accused a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 5 years, which the Supreme Court found inadequate.

3. Notice was issued to the accused regarding the proposal to enhance the sentence, and they filed written submissions in response.

4. The arguments were heard from the senior counsel representing the accused and the Additional Solicitor General representing the Central Bureau of Investigation.

5. The Supreme Court confirmed the conviction under Section 5 of TADA and decided not to review it at this stage, as it had already considered the arguments and dismissed the review petitions.

Issue-

The accused contended that they had a right to re-canvass the finding, similar to the principle in the present Code of Criminal Procedure, but the court disagreed.

The accused also argued that the Supreme Court lacked the power to enhance the sentence without a specific appeal from the government, as it does not possess revisional powers like the High Court and Court of Sessions.

Judgment

1. The court clarified that the Supreme Court's powers under Article 142 of the Constitution are not restricted by statutory provisions and can be exercised when necessary for doing complete justice.

2. The court referred to various previous judgments that recognized the broad and residual powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142.

3. The court highlighted that its powers under Article 142 are to ensure due and proper administration of justice and are not limited or restricted by statutory law.
   
   

PART VI

CHARAN LAL SAHU VS FAKRUDDIN ALI AHMED AND ORS AIR 1974

Brief Facts-

The petitioner claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate but faced rejection due to non-compliance with Sections 5B and 5C. The petitioner's nomination was rejected for failing to fulfill the requirements of Sections 5B (1) and 5C (2). Section 5B (1) requires a nomination paper to be submitted with the assent of the candidate, along with proposers and seconders. Section 5C(1) mandates a deposit of Rs. 2,500, which must be either paid in cash or accompanied by a receipt from the Reserve Bank of India or Government Treasury.

Issues

The petitioner argues that Sections 5B and 5C are unconstitutional, but fails to provide sufficient reasons to support this claim. The primary issue before the court is whether the petitioner can be considered a duly nominated "candidate" based on their compliance with Sections 5B and 5C.

Judgment

The court finds that the petitioner did not fulfil the requirements of sub-section (2) of Section 5C since they submitted a cheque instead of depositing the required amount in cash or providing a valid receipt. Consequently, the court dismisses the petition on the grounds that the petitioner lacks locus standi to maintain the case.

CHARAN LAL SAHU VS GIANI ZAIL SINGH & ANOTHER 1984 AIR 309, 1984 SCR (2) 6

Brief Facts-

1. Only Giani Zail Singh and Shri H.R. Khanna were accepted as candidates for the office of the President of India.

2. Election held on July 12, 1982, and Giani Zail Singh declared as the successful candidate.

3. Election Petitions Nos. 2 and 3 challenged the election, alleging undue influence by Giani Zail Singh.

Issue-

Whether the election of a candidate can be challenged based on unsuitability for the office.

Judgment

1. The challenge to a Presidential or Vice-Presidential election is limited to the grounds specified in the law (Section 18(1)).

2. Parliament has the power to specify the types of doubts or disputes to be inquired into by the Supreme Court in election petitions.

3. The case does not disclose any cause of action for setting aside the election based on the grounds specified in Section 18(1)(a).

CHARAN LAL SAHU VS NEELAM SANJEEVA REDDY 1978 AIR 499, 1978 SCR (3) 1

Brief Facts-

1. The petitioner filed nomination papers as a candidate for the Presidential elections held on July 19, 1977.

2. The nomination papers were not supported by the deposit prescribed under Section 5C and not subscribed by any voter as a proposer and a seconder, as required by Section 5B of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act (Act 31), 1952, made under Article 71(1) of the Constitution of India.

3. The Returning Officer rejected the petitioner's nomination papers for non-compliance with the provisions of Sections 5B and 5C of the Act.

4. The respondent was duly elected, and the petitioner challenged the election under Section 14 of the Act.

Issues-

1. Whether the nomination papers were validly rejected by the Returning Officer?

2. Whether Sections 5B and 5C of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952, are in conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution?

3. Whether the Constitution Amendment 1974, introducing Article 71(3), takes away the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to decide matters related to the Presidential election?

4. Whether the petitioner has the locus standi to challenge the election?

Judgment

1. The nomination papers were rightly rejected by the Returning Officer.

2. Sections 5B and 5C of the Act and the Constitution Amendment 1974, introducing Article 71(3), are valid and do not invade any basic structure of the Constitution.

3. Article 58 of the Constitution only provides qualifications or conditions for the eligibility of a candidate and is unrelated to the nomination process.

4. Sections 5B and 5C of the Act, which lay down conditions for candidates, are not in conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution and impose reasonable conditions applicable to all.

Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri vs The Union of India and Others 1951 AIR 41, 1950 SCR 869

Brief Facts

1. The Governor-General of India promulgated an Ordinance, later enacted as the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1950, to address mismanagement and neglect in the company affecting production and causing unemployment.

2. The Act resulted in the dismissal of managing agents, automatic vacation of office for directors, appointment of new directors by the government, curtailment of shareholder rights, and modification of the Indian Companies Act for the company.

3. A shareholder of the company filed an application under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking a declaration that the Act was void and violated fundamental rights.

Issues

The petitioner argued that the Act infringed fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(f), 31, and 14 of the Constitution.

Judgment

1. The Supreme Court held that the Act did not violate the petitioner's fundamental rights under Article 31(1) as it did not deprive the company or the petitioner of their property except under authority of law.

2. The Court also ruled that the Act did not authorize the acquisition or taking possession of the property of the company or the petitioner, although certain shareholder rights were disabled.

3. The Supreme Court held that the Act did not violate the petitioner's fundamental rights under Article 31(1) as it did not deprive the company or the petitioner of their property except under authority of law.

4. The Court also ruled that the Act did not authorize the acquisition or taking possession of the property of the company or the petitioner, although certain shareholder rights were disabled.

PART VII

CLERKS OR CALCUTTA TRAMWAYS VS CALCUTTA TRAMWAYS CO. LTD 1957 AIR 78, 1956 SCR 772

Brief Facts

• The Bengal Chamber of Commerce conducted an investigation into the cost of living index for middle-class families and determined the dearness allowance payable to employees of mercantile firms in Calcutta.

• The appellants, who were clerks of the respondent Company, argued before the Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal that they should receive the same dearness allowance rates as the middle-class families, as determined by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.

• They contested the procedure followed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, which did not fully neutralize 20 points of the living cost index, claiming it was unjustifiable.

Issues

Whether the appellants were entitled to receive the same dearness allowance rates as the middle-class families, as determined by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.

Judgment

• The Supreme Court held that there cannot be a uniform rule applicable to all employees regarding the grant of dearness allowance.

• It stated that, except for the lowest class of manual laborers, it is not appropriate to neutralize the entire rise in the cost of living through dearness allowance.

• The court acknowledged the existence of different grades within the middle classes and ruled that the appellants cannot claim the same dearness allowance rates as those fixed for clerks of mercantile firms by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.

Coffee Board, Bangalore vs Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Madras 1971 AIR 870, 1970 SCR (3) 147

Brief Facts

1. The Coffee Board claimed exemption from sales tax under Art. 286(1) (b) of the Constitution.

2. The Board argued that certain sales of coffee made to registered exporters for export outside India should not be taxed under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959.

3. The taxing authorities held that the sales took place within Tamil Nadu and were liable to be taxed under the Tamil Nadu Act.

4. The Board filed petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the levy.

Issues:

1. Whether the Coffee Board, being a corporation, could file a petition under Art. 32.

2. Whether the sales of coffee by the Board qualified as sales in the course of export.

Judgment

The majority held that the sales by the Coffee Board were not sales in the course of export, and therefore, they were liable to be taxed under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The petitioner's claim for exemption was rejected.

COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE VS RMDC PRESS PVT LTD 2003 (161) ELT 868 Tri Del

Brief Facts

1. The case involves the classification of 'printed wrappers' and 'printed sleeves' for excise duty purposes.

2. The Assistant Collector classified both products under sub-heading 4818.90, considering them as packing materials rather than products of the printing industry.

3. The appellants argued that the items should be classified under sub-heading 4901.90 as products of the printing industry.

4. The appellants relied on a Supreme Court ruling in the case of Metagraphs Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, which held that printed aluminum labels were products of the printing industry.

Issues

The appellants argued that the items were primarily used for advertising and displaying the merits of the goods, making them products of the printing industry.

Judgment

• The Third Member noted that in a similar case, the Tribunal classified printed wrappers as articles of the packaging industry.

• The Third Member emphasized that the function of wrapping occurred even without printing, relying on the judgment in the New Jack Printing Works case.

• The Third Member concluded that the appeal should be dismissed, upholding the classification of the items as packaging materials.

• The order confirmed the earlier decision of the Assistant Collector, rejecting the appellants' claim for classification under the sub-heading for printing industry products.

COLLECTOR LAND ACQUISITION ANANTNAG VS MRS. KATIJI (1987) 2 SCC 107

Brief Facts

1. The State filed an appeal against a decision to enhance compensation for the acquisition of lands for a public purpose.

2. The appeal raised important questions related to valuation principles.

3. The High Court dismissed the appeal as time-barred, as it was filed four days beyond the prescribed time limit.

4. The State applied for condonation of delay, seeking an extension of time to file the appeal.

5. The High Court rejected the application for condonation of delay.

6. The State then appealed to the higher court, seeking special leave.

Issues

The court examined the interpretation of the term "sufficient cause" mentioned in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963.

Judgment

The court stated that the interpretation of "sufficient cause" should be guided by the spirit and philosophy of the provision, ensuring equitable administration of the law.

1. In this case, the court found sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal in the High Court.

2. The court granted condonation of delay, remitted the matter back to the High Court, and directed it to dispose of the case on its merits.

COMMON CAUSE (A regd. Society) VS UNION OF INDIA (1999) 6 SCC 107

Brief Facts

This writ petition sought a declaration that the “right to die with dignity” fell within the fold of “right to live with dignity” under Article 21, and to ensure that persons of deteriorated health or terminally ill could execute a living will or an Advance Medical Directive. 

While this case was initially placed before a three Judge Bench, in light of contradictory precedents in determining the law relating to the right to die in India, it was referred to a Constitution Bench.

Issues

Whether the right to die with dignity was a fundamental right within the fold of the right to live with dignity guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Judgment

The Court reaffirmed that the right to die with dignity was a fundamental right, as declared by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Gian Kaur vs state of Punjab. The Court also clarified that the ratio of Gian Kaur did not introduce the concept of passive euthanasia. 

The Court discussed the distinction between active and passive euthanasia, where active euthanasia requires an overt action, whereas passive euthanasia is the act of withdrawal of life support. It held that the Court in Aruna Shanbaug had erred in holding that passive euthanasia could only be introduced through a legislation.

The Court opined that the right to privacy mandated safeguarding the integrity of individual choice in the intimate sphere of decisions relating to death and held that the protection of these rights was an emanation of the right to privacy, as they were related to the fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.

COMPETENT AUTHORITY, AHMEDABAD VS AMRITLAL CHANDMAL JAIN AND ORS 1998

Brief Facts

1. The appeals (Criminal Appeal Nos. 2/94 and 574/94) are filed against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court declaring the detention order under COFEPOSA against Amritlal Jain illegal and quashing the proceedings under SAFEMA.

2. The Competent Authority and the State of Gujarat have filed the appeals.

3. The third appeal (Civil Appeal 1487/94) is filed by the Competent Authority against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court dismissing their writ petition seeking to restrain the release of seized silver to Amritlal and Agra Bullion Company.

4. The Competent Authority is an officer of the Central Government appointed under SAFEMA.

5. Amritlal was initially detained under COFEPOSA in 1982 but challenged his detention in the Supreme Court through a writ of habeas corpus. The state revoked the detention order but issued a fresh one on the same grounds.

Issues

The Competent Authority appealed against the High Court's judgment, arguing that the second order of detention was challenged after the appropriate time, citing the decision in the Amritlal Prajivandas case.

Judgment

1. The Supreme Court noted that challenges were made to both orders of detention during their respective periods and that the release of the detenu rendered the first writ petition infructuous.

2. The Court stated that if a writ petition is disposed of on the grounds of release, it does not imply an unsuccessful challenge to the order of detention.

3. The Court found no merit in the appeals and dismissed them.

CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA VS GOVERNERS OF ST. THOMAS SCHOOL, CALCUTTA (1950) 52 BOMLR 25

Brief Facts

• The appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in West Bengal.

• The premises in question, located in Calcutta, comprise a specific area of land with buildings on it, owned by the Governors of St. Thomas' School.

• The premises were requisitioned by the Central Government in April 1942 under the Defense of India Act and possession was taken.

• A memorandum of agreement was executed between the respondents and the Governor-General in Council, determining the compensation payable to the owners during the period of requisition.

• The Central Government erected additional buildings on the premises at a later date.

• There was a re-valuation of the premises under the Calcutta Municipal Act, and the value of the additional structures was included, resulting in an increased annual value for taxation.

Issues

The respondents objected to this assessment, arguing that the structures put up by the Government should be exempt from municipal taxes.

The appellants argued that the buildings should not be separately assessed as the land was not vested in the Government and that the proviso to Section 154 of the Government of India Act should apply.

Judgment

• The Supreme Court rejected the appellants' contentions, stating that the buildings were vested in the Government under the agreement and the ownership of a building is not necessarily linked to the ownership of the land.

• The Court held that the buildings were considered property under Section 154 of the Government of India Act and were exempt from municipal taxes.

• The Court also rejected the argument that the unit of assessment should include the additional structures based on the provisions of the local Municipal Act.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the decision of the High Court that the additional structures erected by the Central Government were exempt from municipal taxes.

Bihar Legal Support Society vs. the Chief Justice of India 1987 AIR 38, 1987 SCR (1) 295

Brief Facts

• A writ petition was filed as a sequel to the expeditious consideration of a bail application of two industrialists by the Court on September 5, 1986.

• The petitioner sought equal treatment and importance for special leave petitions filed by small individuals against orders refusing bail.

Issues

• Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with orders granting or refusing bail or anticipatory bail, and under what circumstances?

• Whether small individuals are given the same treatment and importance as big industrialists in special leave petitions?

Judgment

1. The court proposed the establishment of a National Court of Appeal to handle appeals from High Courts and Tribunals in civil, criminal, revenue, and labor cases.

2. The current apex court should focus on cases involving constitutional and public law issues.

M/S BIHAR STATE FOOD & SUPPLIES VS. M/S. Godrej Soaps Pvt. Ltd. & Ors 1996

Brief Facts

1. An appeal was filed against the decree of Suit No. 1028/78, which is currently pending disposal.

2. UCO Bank has also filed an appeal, which is also pending.

3. The appellants (not specified) have filed an application for the transfer of Suit No. 398/89 back to the Subordinate Judge's court in Patna, arguing that the joint trial order has outlived its purpose, and Suit No. 398/89 needs to be tried on issues not covered in Suit No. 1028/78.

Judgment

After recording all the evidence from both parties, the learned trial Judge is requested to transmit the entire evidence and the suit's record to the Division Bench for consideration.

1. Liberty is given to make a request before the Division Bench to adduce evidence in the suits for their early disposal after receiving the suit's record.

2. The Transfer Petition is disposed of accordingly.

Bijoyo Kumar Pattanaik vs. Basanta Kumar Pattanaik and Ors. J T 2000 (9) SC 35, (2000) 9 SCC 335

Brief FACTS: -

The appellant and respondent Nos. 1 to 4 filed a civil suit in 1975 for partition and separate possession of their shares in the suit properties.

1. The original defendant No. 3 contested the suit, including raising objections regarding the court's pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

2. The trial court overruled the objection and passed a preliminary decree for partition against defendant No. 3.

3. Defendant No. 3 appealed the decision, and the first appellate court held that the trial court lacked pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The judgment and decree of the trial court were set aside.

4. The appellant's appeal against the first appellate court's decision was dismissed by the High Court.

5. The appellant then filed a review petition, which was also dismissed by the High Court.

6. Instead of getting the plaint returned for presentation to the proper court, the appellant requested the trial court to allow transposition of the plaintiffs as defendants.

7. The trial court, based on the appellate court's finding of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction, denied permission for transposition.

Issues

1. Whether the trial court had pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

2. Whether the appellant should have requested the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper court instead of seeking transposition.

3. What should be the course of action to ensure justice in the case?

Judgment

1. The appellant was allowed to transpose the original plaintiffs as defendants, amending the plaint accordingly.

2. The appellant was given eight weeks to carry out the amendment in the plaint.

3. The appellant, as the sole plaintiff after transposition, was required to pay the proper court fees and make good any shortfall.

4. The court directed the office to inform and take necessary action in the trial court regarding the order.

Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors on 5 November, 1981

1. The State Government of Uttar Pradesh issued two orders under the Essential Commodities Act, 1951, namely the Uttar Pradesh Food Grains Dealers (Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1976, and the Uttar Pradesh Food Grains (Procurement and Regulation of Trade) Order, 1978.

2. The State Government issued instructions for effective enforcement of the two orders, particularly regulating the movement of wheat by traders.

3. The State Government amended clause (4) of the 1978 Order, limiting the stock of wheat that wholesale dealers, commission agents, and retailers can possess at any time.

4. The Senior Marketing Inspector and the Chief Marketing Inspector intercepted and seized trucks loaded with wheat from the petitioners, who were wholesale dealers of foodgrains.

5. The seized wheat was purchased by the State Government on government account, and the sale proceeds were credited to the treasury.

6. The petitioners challenged the orders and instructions on various grounds, including violation of their fundamental rights under Articles 19(1) (g) and 301 of the Constitution.

Issue

1. Whether the stock limit imposed on wholesale dealers is an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of trade guaranteed under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution.

2. Whether the distinction between wholesale dealers and commission agents in terms of stock limit is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

3. Whether the instructions on movement restrictions violate the fundamental rights of the traders.

4. Whether the seizure of wheat in transit was without "the authority of law" and violated Article 300A of the Constitution.

5. Whether the restrictions imposed by executive action are valid.

Judgment

The petitions challenging the orders and instructions are dismissed, upholding the validity of the restrictions imposed by the State Government. The case is remitted to the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies), Agra, for further proceedings on the seized wheat.

Bishan Das and Others vs. the State Of Punjab and Others 1961 AIR 1570, 1962 SCR (2) 69

Brief Facts

1. Ramjidas’s built a Dharamshala, a temple, and shops on Government land using joint family funds with the permission of the Government.

2. After Ramjidas's death, the other family members who managed and possessed the properties were dispossessed by the State, its officers, and the local Municipality, who took possession of the properties.

3. The High Court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it involved disputed questions of fact.

4. An appeal against the High Court's order was also dismissed on the same ground.

Issues

The petitioners argued that their eviction was unauthorized and violated the Constitution.

Judgment

1. The Court deprecated the executive action taken in this case as it violated the principles of the rule of law and deprived a person of property without legal authority.

2. The Court emphasized that the petitioners were bona fide in possession of the property and could only be removed by authority of law.

3. It was unnecessary to determine disputed questions of fact or the precise rights of the petitioners in this case.

Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others vs. the State Of Uttar Pradesh 1954 AIR 10, 1954 SCR 1169

Brief Facts

1. The Executive Committee of a District Bar Association received multiple complaints against a Judicial Magistrate and a Revenue Officer regarding their conduct and handling of cases.

2. The Committee passed a resolution in camera, stating their opinion that the two officers were incompetent, lacked judicial work, and were discourteous to litigants and lawyers.

3. The resolution was typed by the President, forwarded confidentially to the District Magistrate, Commissioner of the Division, and the Chief Secretary and Premier of the State.

Issues

Whether the resolution passed by the appellants, criticizing the officers, constituted contempt of court.

Judgment

The High Court held the appellants guilty of contempt but accepted their apology.

On appeal, it was held that the contempt, if any, was of a technical nature.

After the appellants filed their affidavits before the High Court, the proceedings against them should have been dropped

PART V

Budhi Nath Jha vs. Manilal Jadav AIR 1960 Pat 361

Brief Facts-

• The petitioner, Budhi Nath Jha, filed an election petition challenging the order of the Election Tribunal, Santal Parganas, which was subsequently set aside by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.

• The High Court further ordered the dismissal of the election petition filed by Budhi Nath Jha due to non-compliance with Section 117 of the Representation of the People Act.

Issues-

• The petitioner argued for the grant of a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 of the Constitution, stating that the subject matter of the dispute exceeded the value of Rs. 20,000.

• The respondent contended that the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court was not a "civil proceeding" within the meaning of Article 133.

Judgment

• The petitioner argued for the grant of a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 of the Constitution, stating that the subject matter of the dispute exceeded the value of Rs. 20,000.

• The respondent contended that the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court was not a "civil proceeding" within the meaning of Article 133.

C DHANALAKSHMI AMMAL VS THE INCOME TAX OFFICER (1957) 2 MLJ 567

Brief Facts-

• Petitioner filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a writ of mandamus to prevent the attachment and sale of her properties for the alleged income-tax arrears of her husband.

• The petitioner's property, Benhutty Estate, was attached by the Collector of Nilgiris district based on a certificate issued by the Income-Tax Officer.

• The petitioner claimed that she was the legal owner of the property, although the Income-Tax Department argued that she was only a benamidar, and the real owner was her husband.

Issues

The petitioner argued that the Madras Revenue Recovery Act did not authorize the Collector to attach and sell land registered in someone else's name other than the defaulter.

Judgment

• The Court rejected the argument that an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a civil proceeding.

• The Court held that a proceeding under Article 226, seeking enforcement of civil rights or challenging the adjudication of administrative tribunals, can be considered a civil proceeding.

• The Court held that the order did not directly or indirectly involve a claim or question respecting the property.

C.N. Rudramurthy vs K. Barkathulla Khan & Others, 1998

Brief Facts:

1. The appellant filed a suit against Bhaskaran, the original tenant, for recovery of possession of a premises due to non-payment of rent and alleged subletting.

2. The original tenant argued that he had not sublet the premises but had only entered into an agreement for someone to run the business on his behalf.

3. The original tenant passed away and his legal representatives were brought into the case.

4. Respondent No.1 claimed to be a partner with the original tenant and asserted that the partnership was dissolved, making him a tenant directly under the appellant.

5. A decree for eviction was passed against Respondent No.1 in the City Civil Court on 31.3.1993.

6. Respondent No.1 appealed against the decree in the High Court of Karnataka.

Issues-

1. Whether Respondent No.1 is a tenant or not? If not, what is his status?

2. Whether the suit for eviction is maintainable against Respondent No.1?

3. Whether Respondent No.1 is entitled to mesne profits under Order XX Rule 10 of the C.P.C.?

Judgment

The appeal filed by the original tenant's legal representatives was allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside.

Respondent No.1 was directed to vacate the premises by June 30, 1999, upon providing the required undertaking.

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act and reaffirmed its binding nature on all courts.

The Cantonment Board, Ambala vs Pyarelal 1966 AIR 108, 1965 SCR

Brief Facts:

1. In 1954, the words "rent on land or buildings" were added to Section 250 of the Cantonments Act, 1924.

2. The appellant (Cantonment Board) sought to recover arrears of rent from the respondent based on a lease agreement.

3. The appellant applied to the Magistrate for the realization of the rent arrears under the amended section.

4. The Magistrate issued warrants for the attachment of the respondent's movable property.

5. The respondent filed a revision petition before the Sessions Judge, who referred the case to the High Court.

6. The High Court set aside the Magistrate's order.

Issues

Whether the Magistrate had the power to order the recovery of rent due to the appellant under the amended Section 259 of the Cantonments Act.

Judgment

Justices Wanchoo and Sikri held that the rent was not claimable by the appellant under the Act or the Rules but only under the lease agreement.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, stating that the appellant could not recover the rent arrears from the respondent under the amended Section 259. However, the Board retains the right to recover rent through a civil suit under general law.

THE CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA VS. THEIR WORKMEN 196 AIR 12, 1960 SCR (1) 200

Brief Facts

1. Section 10(1)(b)(11) of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, stated that no banking company could employ any person whose remuneration or part of whose remuneration takes the form of a share in the profits of the company.

2. A dispute arose between the appellant banks and their employees regarding whether the provisions of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, prohibited the grant of bonus to bank employees.

3. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the Act did not prohibit the granting of bonus to bank employees since it did not constitute a share in the profits of the company.

4. The appellant banks argued that bonus awarded by the Industrial Courts was considered remuneration under Section 10 read with Section 2 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, and also constituted a share in profits.

5. The appellant banks contended that the express provisions of Section 10, read with Section 2, overrode the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and therefore prohibited the award of bonus to bank employees.

Issues

1. Whether the expression "shall employ any person" in Section 10 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, includes "shall have in employment any person"?

2. Whether bonus awarded to bank employees is considered remuneration under the Act?

3. Whether bonus constitutes a share in profits, thereby falling under the provisions of Section 10?

4. Whether the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1956, has retrospective effect on the prohibition of the grant of industrial bonus?

Judgment

The expression "shall employ any person" in Section 10 includes "shall have in employment any person," and the 1956 amendment clarifies the original intent of the section.

The Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1956, is not a declaratory act and does not explain or declare the former law. It has no retrospective effect, and therefore, for the period relating to the present appeals, the amended section does not apply.

CENRAL COALFIELDS LTD VS STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AIR 1986 MP 33a

Brief Facts-

1. The petitioner company applied for acquiring lands in Singrauli Tahsil for mining operations, which were notified as coal-bearing areas under the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957.

2. Approximately 1857 acres of land were acquired by the Central Government, and the rights and liabilities of the Central Government were transferred to the petitioner company under the Coal Act.

3. The petitioner argues that the provisions of the Adhiniyam, which regulate construction activities, are not applicable to their property as the lands have been acquired for mining purposes and fall under the jurisdiction of the Coal Act and the Development Act.

4. The petitioner undertook construction work for office buildings, residential quarters, and other structures without obtaining the necessary permission as required by the Adhiniyam.

5. The Chairman of SADA issued a notice to the petitioner, calling for the demolition of the unauthorized constructions.

6. The petitioner contended that the Adhiniyam and the Municipalities Act do not apply to their construction activities as the petitioner company is a government-owned company and exempted from obtaining permission under Section 29 of the Adhiniyam.

7. The respondents argued that SADA, Singrauli, has the power to regulate building construction activities within its jurisdiction under the Adhiniyam and the Municipalities Act, even if the petitioner is engaged in mining operations.

Issues

1. Whether the provisions of the Adhiniyam are applicable to the petitioner's property acquired for mining purposes under the Coal Act.

2. Whether the petitioner company is exempted from obtaining permission for construction activities under Section 29 of the Adhiniyam as a government-owned company.

Judgment

1. The doctrine of occupied fields does not apply as the powers and duties of SADA and municipalities under the Adhiniyam are different from those provided in the Coal Act and the Development Act. The State Legislature retains its competence to enact laws for municipal administration.

2. The petitioner company, being a government-owned company, does not fall within the scope of Section 29 of the Adhiniyam. The company has a distinct legal entity and is not equated with a government department.

THE CHAIRMAN RAILWAY BOARD & ORS VS. MRS. CHANDRIMA DAS AND ORS AIR 2000

Brief Facts

• Mrs. Chandrima Das(respondent herein), a practicing advocate of the Calcutta High Court, filed a petition under Article 226 of Constitution against the Chairman of Railway Board(appellant herein), claiming compensation for the victim (Smt. Hanuffa Khatoon), a Bangladeshi National who was gang-raped by many including employees of the Railways in a room at Yatri Niwas at Howrah Station.

• The HC awarded a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs as compensation for Smt. Khatoon. The HC was of the opinion that the rape was committed at the building belonging to the Railways and was perpetrated by the railway employees and thus the Railway board is vicariously liable.

• This appeal is against the HC judgment in favor of Chandrima Das.

Issues

• Is it right to contend that the Central Government can’t be held vicariously liable for the offence of rape committed by the employees of the Railways?

• Is it right to contend that for claiming damages for the offence perpetrated on Smt. Khatoon, the remedy lay in the domain of private law and not under public law and, therefore, no compensation could have been legally awarded under Article 226?

Judgment

• The HC has jurisdiction not only to grant relief for the enforcement of fundamental rights but also for ‘any purpose’ which would include the enforcement of public duties by public bodies.

• This is done to prevent the State or the public bodies from acting in an arbitrary manner. SC, in a number of cases, has awarded compensation for the personal injuries caused by the officers of the government, like in Rudal Shah Vs State of Bihar. Therefore, compensation can be legally awarded in this case under public law, i.e. Article 226.

THE CHAIRMAN RAILWAY BOARD & ORS VS. MRS. CHANDRIMA DAS AND ORS AIR 2000

Brief Facts

• Mrs. Chandrima Das(respondent herein), a practicing advocate of the Calcutta High Court, filed a petition under Article 226 of Constitution against the Chairman of Railway Board(appellant herein), claiming compensation for the victim (Smt. Hanuffa Khatoon), a Bangladeshi National who was gang-raped by many including employees of the Railways in a room at Yatri Niwas at Howrah Station.

• The HC awarded a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs as compensation for Smt. Khatoon. The HC was of the opinion that the rape was committed at the building belonging to the Railways and was perpetrated by the railway employees and thus the Railway board is vicariously liable.

• This appeal is against the HC judgment in favor of Chandrima Das.

Issues

• Is it right to contend that the Central Government can’t be held vicariously liable for the offence of rape committed by the employees of the Railways?

• Is it right to contend that for claiming damages for the offence perpetrated on Smt. Khatoon, the remedy lay in the domain of private law and not under public law and, therefore, no compensation could have been legally awarded under Article 226?

Judgment

• The HC has jurisdiction not only to grant relief for the enforcement of fundamental rights but also for ‘any purpose’ which would include the enforcement of public duties by public bodies.

• This is done to prevent the State or the public bodies from acting in an arbitrary manner. SC, in a number of cases, has awarded compensation for the personal injuries caused by the officers of the government, like in Rudal Shah Vs State of Bihar. Therefore, compensation can be legally awarded in this case under public law, i.e. Article 226.

CHANDRA BANSI SINGH AND ORS VS STATE OF BIHAR 1984 AIR 1767, 1985 SCR (1) 579

Brief Facts

1. The Respondent State issued a Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to acquire 1034.94 acres of land in Village Digha for the construction of houses by the Bihar State Housing Board.

2. The compensation for the acquired land was to be paid by the Housing Board and not by the State from its own funds.

3. The acquisition was confirmed by the State Ministry of Revenue and Industry after issuing Notifications under Sections 6, 7, and 9 and considering the claims and objections.

Issues

A portion of the acquired land comprising 4.03 acres belonging to the Pandey families was released without any legal or constitutional justification.

4. The release of land in favor of the Pandey families was deemed an act of favoritism without justification.

5. Writ Petitions challenging the land release were filed in the Bihar High Court, leading to the present Civil Appeals and Special Leave Petitions.

Judgment

The Court held that the order of release passed by the government was (invalid) as it violated Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law.

The release of land to the Pandey families lacked legal or constitutional justification and was an act of favouritism.

CHANDRA MOHAN VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 1966

Brief Facts

• The recruitment procedure for district judges in the State of U.P. is governed by the U.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules made by the Governor under Article 309 of the Constitution.

• The Governor decides on the number of candidates to be selected and prescribes their qualifications.

• The High Court calls for applications, and a Selection Committee screens the applications and conducts interviews.

• The Selection Committee selects suitable candidates for appointment and sends two lists (main and supplementary) to the High Court.

• The High Court submits the names of suitable candidates to the Governor for appointment.

Issues

1. Can the appellant challenge the judgment of the High Court related to the "Advocate-recruits"?

2. Is the appointment process, which involves consultation with both the High Court and the Selection Committee, legal under the Constitution?

3. Does the Governor have the power to appoint district judges from "judicial officers"?

Judgment

1. The Governor cannot appoint district judges from "judicial officers" as they are not members of the judicial service.

2. The Indian Constitution provides for an independent judiciary and emphasizes the separation of the judiciary from the executive.

3. Arts. 233 to 237 of the Constitution deal with the appointment and control of the judiciary, including district judges.

CHANDRAKANT PATIL VS. STATE AIR 1998

Brief Facts

1. The accused, Subhash Singh Thakur, Jayendra Thakur, Shyam Kishore Garikapati, and Chandrakant Patil, were found guilty under Section 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA).

2. The trial court had awarded each accused a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 5 years, which the Supreme Court found inadequate.

3. Notice was issued to the accused regarding the proposal to enhance the sentence, and they filed written submissions in response.

4. The arguments were heard from the senior counsel representing the accused and the Additional Solicitor General representing the Central Bureau of Investigation.

5. The Supreme Court confirmed the conviction under Section 5 of TADA and decided not to review it at this stage, as it had already considered the arguments and dismissed the review petitions.

Issues

The accused contended that they had a right to re-canvass the finding, similar to the principle in the present Code of Criminal Procedure, but the court disagreed.

The accused also argued that the Supreme Court lacked the power to enhance the sentence without a specific appeal from the government, as it does not possess revisional powers like the High Court and Court of Sessions.

Judgment

1. The court clarified that the Supreme Court's powers under Article 142 of the Constitution are not restricted by statutory provisions and can be exercised when necessary for doing complete justice.

2. The court referred to various previous judgments that recognized the broad and residual powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142.

3. The court highlighted that its powers under Article 142 are to ensure due and proper administration of justice and are not limited or restricted by statutory law.

PART VI

CHARAN LAL SAHU VS FAKRUDDIN ALI AHMED AND ORS AIR 1974

Brief Facts

The petitioner claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate but faced rejection due to non-compliance with Sections 5B and 5C.

The petitioner's nomination was rejected for failing to fulfill the requirements of Sections 5B (1) and 5C (2).

Section 5B (1) requires a nomination paper to be submitted with the assent of the candidate, along with proposers and seconders.

Section 5C(1) mandates a deposit of Rs. 2,500, which must be either paid in cash or accompanied by a receipt from the Reserve Bank of India or Government Treasury.

Issues

The petitioner argues that Sections 5B and 5C are unconstitutional, but fails to provide sufficient reasons to support this claim.

The primary issue before the court is whether the petitioner can be considered a duly nominated "candidate" based on their compliance with Sections 5B and 5C.

Judgment

The court finds that the petitioner did not fulfill the requirements of sub-section (2) of Section 5C since they submitted a cheque instead of depositing the required amount in cash or providing a valid receipt. Consequently, the court dismisses the petition on the grounds that the petitioner lacks locus standi to maintain the case.

CHARAN LAL SAHU VS GIANI ZAIL SINGH & ANOTHER 1984 AIR 309, 1984 SCR (2) 6

Brief Facts

1. Only Giani Zail Singh and Shri H.R. Khanna were accepted as candidates for the office of the President of India.

2. Election held on July 12, 1982, and Giani Zail Singh declared as the successful candidate.

3. Election Petitions Nos. 2 and 3 challenged the election, alleging undue influence by Giani Zail Singh.

Issues

Whether the election of a candidate can be challenged based on unsuitability for the office.

Judgment

1. The challenge to a Presidential or Vice-Presidential election is limited to the grounds specified in the law (Section 18(1)).

2. Parliament has the power to specify the types of doubts or disputes to be inquired into by the Supreme Court in election petitions.

3. The case does not disclose any cause of action for setting aside the election based on the grounds specified in Section 18(1)(a).

CHARAN LAL SAHU VS NEELAM SANJEEVA REDDY 1978 AIR 499, 1978 SCR (3) 1

Brief Facts

1. The petitioner filed nomination papers as a candidate for the Presidential elections held on July 19, 1977.

2. The nomination papers were not supported by the deposit prescribed under Section 5C and not subscribed by any voter as a proposer and a seconder, as required by Section 5B of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act (Act 31), 1952, made under Article 71(1) of the Constitution of India.

3. The Returning Officer rejected the petitioner's nomination papers for non-compliance with the provisions of Sections 5B and 5C of the Act.

4. The respondent was duly elected, and the petitioner challenged the election under Section 14 of the Act.

Issues

1. Whether the nomination papers were validly rejected by the Returning Officer?

2. Whether Sections 5B and 5C of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952, are in conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution?

3. Whether the Constitution Amendment 1974, introducing Article 71(3), takes away the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to decide matters related to the Presidential election?

4. Whether the petitioner has the locus standi to challenge the election?

Judgment

1. The nomination papers were rightly rejected by the Returning Officer.

2. Sections 5B and 5C of the Act and the Constitution Amendment 1974, introducing Article 71(3), are valid and do not invade any basic structure of the Constitution.

3. Article 58 of the Constitution only provides qualifications or conditions for the eligibility of a candidate and is unrelated to the nomination process.

4. Sections 5B and 5C of the Act, which lay down conditions for candidates, are not in conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution and impose reasonable conditions applicable to all.

Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri vs The Union of India and Others 1951 AIR 41, 1950 SCR 869

Brief Facts

1. The Governor-General of India promulgated an Ordinance, later enacted as the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1950, to address mismanagement and neglect in the company affecting production and causing unemployment.

2. The Act resulted in the dismissal of managing agents, automatic vacation of office for directors, appointment of new directors by the government, curtailment of shareholder rights, and modification of the Indian Companies Act for the company.

3. A shareholder of the company filed an application under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking a declaration that the Act was void and violated fundamental rights.

Issues

The petitioner argued that the Act infringed fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(f), 31, and 14 of the Constitution.

Judgment

1. The Supreme Court held that the Act did not violate the petitioner's fundamental rights under Article 31(1) as it did not deprive the company or the petitioner of their property except under authority of law.

2. The Court also ruled that the Act did not authorize the acquisition or taking possession of the property of the company or the petitioner, although certain shareholder rights were disabled.

3. The Supreme Court held that the Act did not violate the petitioner's fundamental rights under Article 31(1) as it did not deprive the company or the petitioner of their property except under authority of law.

4. The Court also ruled that the Act did not authorize the acquisition or taking possession of the property of the company or the petitioner, although certain shareholder rights were disabled.

PART VII

CLERKS OR CALCUTTA TRAMWAYS VS CALCUTTA TRAMWAYS CO. LTD 1957 AIR 78, 1956 SCR 772

Brief Facts

• The Bengal Chamber of Commerce conducted an investigation into the cost of living index for middle-class families and determined the dearness allowance payable to employees of mercantile firms in Calcutta.

• The appellants, who were clerks of the respondent Company, argued before the Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal that they should receive the same dearness allowance rates as the middle-class families, as determined by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.

• They contested the procedure followed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, which did not fully neutralize 20 points of the living cost index, claiming it was unjustifiable.

Issues

Whether the appellants were entitled to receive the same dearness allowance rates as the middle-class families, as determined by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.

Judgment

• The Supreme Court held that there cannot be a uniform rule applicable to all employees regarding the grant of dearness allowance.

• It stated that, except for the lowest class of manual laborers, it is not appropriate to neutralize the entire rise in the cost of living through dearness allowance.

• The court acknowledged the existence of different grades within the middle classes and ruled that the appellants cannot claim the same dearness allowance rates as those fixed for clerks of mercantile firms by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.

Coffee Board, Bangalore vs Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Madras 1971 AIR 870, 1970 SCR (3) 147

Brief Facts

1. The Coffee Board claimed exemption from sales tax under Art. 286(1) (b) of the Constitution.

2. The Board argued that certain sales of coffee made to registered exporters for export outside India should not be taxed under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959.

3. The taxing authorities held that the sales took place within Tamil Nadu and were liable to be taxed under the Tamil Nadu Act.

4. The Board filed petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the levy.

Issues

1. Whether the Coffee Board, being a corporation, could file a petition under Art. 32.

2. Whether the sales of coffee by the Board qualified as sales in the course of export.

Judgment

The majority held that the sales by the Coffee Board were not sales in the course of export, and therefore, they were liable to be taxed under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The petitioner's claim for exemption was rejected.

COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE VS RMDC PRESS PVT LTD 2003 (161) ELT 868 Tri Del

Brief Facts

1. The case involves the classification of 'printed wrappers' and 'printed sleeves' for excise duty purposes.

2. The Assistant Collector classified both products under sub-heading 4818.90, considering them as packing materials rather than products of the printing industry.

3. The appellants argued that the items should be classified under sub-heading 4901.90 as products of the printing industry.

4. The appellants relied on a Supreme Court ruling in the case of Metagraphs Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, which held that printed aluminum labels were products of the printing industry.

Issues

The appellants argued that the items were primarily used for advertising and displaying the merits of the goods, making them products of the printing industry.

Judgment

1. The Third Member noted that in a similar case, the Tribunal classified printed wrappers as articles of the packaging industry.

2. The Third Member emphasized that the function of wrapping occurred even without printing, relying on the judgment in the New Jack Printing Works case.

3. The Third Member concluded that the appeal should be dismissed, upholding the classification of the items as packaging materials.

4. The order confirmed the earlier decision of the Assistant Collector, rejecting the appellants' claim for classification under the sub-heading for printing industry products

COLLECTOR LAND ACQUISITION ANANTNAG VS MRS. KATIJI (1987) 2 SCC 107

Brief Facts

1. The State filed an appeal against a decision to enhance compensation for the acquisition of lands for a public purpose.

2. The appeal raised important questions related to valuation principles.

3. The High Court dismissed the appeal as time-barred, as it was filed four days beyond the prescribed time limit.

4. The State applied for condonation of delay, seeking an extension of time to file the appeal.

5. The High Court rejected the application for condonation of delay.

6. The State then appealed to the higher court, seeking special leave.

Issues

The court examined the interpretation of the term "sufficient cause" mentioned in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963.

Judgment

The court stated that the interpretation of "sufficient cause" should be guided by the spirit and philosophy of the provision, ensuring equitable administration of the law.

1. In this case, the court found sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal in the High Court.

2. The court granted condonation of delay, remitted the matter back to the High Court, and directed it to dispose of the case on its merits.

COMMON CAUSE (A regd. Society) VS UNION OF INDIA (1999) 6 SCC 107

Brief Facts

This writ petition sought a declaration that the “right to die with dignity” fell within the fold of “right to live with dignity” under Article 21, and to ensure that persons of deteriorated health or terminally ill could execute a living will or an Advance Medical Directive. 

While this case was initially placed before a three Judge Bench, in light of contradictory precedents in determining the law relating to the right to die in India, it was referred to a Constitution Bench.

Issues

Whether the right to die with dignity was a fundamental right within the fold of the right to live with dignity guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Judgment

The Court reaffirmed that the right to die with dignity was a fundamental right, as declared by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Gian Kaur vs state of Punjab. The Court also clarified that the ratio of Gian Kaur did not introduce the concept of passive euthanasia. 

The Court discussed the distinction between active and passive euthanasia, where active euthanasia requires an overt action, whereas passive euthanasia is the act of withdrawal of life support. It held that the Court in Aruna Shanbaug had erred in holding that passive euthanasia could only be introduced through a legislation.

The Court opined that the right to privacy mandated safeguarding the integrity of individual choice in the intimate sphere of decisions relating to death and held that the protection of these rights was an emanation of the right to privacy, as they were related to the fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.

COMPETENT AUTHORITY, AHMEDABAD VS AMRITLAL CHANDMAL JAIN AND ORS 1998

Brief Facts-

1. The appeals (Criminal Appeal Nos. 2/94 and 574/94) are filed against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court declaring the detention order under COFEPOSA against Amritlal Jain illegal and quashing the proceedings under SAFEMA.

2. The Competent Authority and the State of Gujarat have filed the appeals.

3. The third appeal (Civil Appeal 1487/94) is filed by the Competent Authority against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court dismissing their writ petition seeking to restrain the release of seized silver to Amritlal and Agra Bullion Company.

4. The Competent Authority is an officer of the Central Government appointed under SAFEMA.

5. Amritlal was initially detained under COFEPOSA in 1982 but challenged his detention in the Supreme Court through a writ of habeas corpus. The state revoked the detention order but issued a fresh one on the same grounds.

Issues

The Competent Authority appealed against the High Court's judgment, arguing that the second order of detention was challenged after the appropriate time, citing the decision in the Amritlal Prajivandas case.

Judgment

1. The Supreme Court noted that challenges were made to both orders of detention during their respective periods and that the release of the detenu rendered the first writ petition infructuous.

2. The Court stated that if a writ petition is disposed of on the grounds of release, it does not imply an unsuccessful challenge to the order of detention.

3. The Court found no merit in the appeals and dismissed them.

CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA VS GOVERNERS OF ST. THOMAS SCHOOL, CALCUTTA (1950) 52 BOMLR 25

Brief Facts-

• The appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in West Bengal.

• The premises in question, located in Calcutta, comprise a specific area of land with buildings on it, owned by the Governors of St. Thomas' School.

• The premises were requisitioned by the Central Government in April 1942 under the Defense of India Act and possession was taken.

• A memorandum of agreement was executed between the respondents and the Governor-General in Council, determining the compensation payable to the owners during the period of requisition.

• The Central Government erected additional buildings on the premises at a later date.

• There was a re-valuation of the premises under the Calcutta Municipal Act, and the value of the additional structures was included, resulting in an increased annual value for taxation.

Issues

The respondents objected to this assessment, arguing that the structures put up by the Government should be exempt from municipal taxes.

The appellants argued that the buildings should not be separately assessed as the land was not vested in the Government and that the proviso to Section 154 of the Government of India Act should apply.

Judgment

• The Supreme Court rejected the appellants' contentions, stating that the buildings were vested in the Government under the agreement and the ownership of a building is not necessarily linked to the ownership of the land.

• The Court held that the buildings were considered property under Section 154 of the Government of India Act and were exempt from municipal taxes.

• The Court also rejected the argument that the unit of assessment should include the additional structures based on the provisions of the local Municipal Act.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the decision of the High Court that the additional structures erected by the Central Government were exempt from municipal taxes.

CST VS PINE CHEMICALS LTD (1995) 1 SCC 58

Brief Facts

1. Government Order No. 159-Ind. dated 26-3-1971, despite any defects, should be understood as an order granting exemption under Section 5 of the Jammu & Kashmir General Sales Tax Act.

2. The said Government Order is effective by itself and does not require any further order to be enforceable.

3. SRO No. 448 dated 22-10-1982 does not supersede the exemption notification mentioned above.

4. Dealers are entitled to claim the benefit of sub-section (2-A) of Section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act based on the exemption granted under Government Order No. 159.

The court limited its discussion to the fourth submission raised in the review petitions. Section 8(2-A) of the Central Sales Tax Act states that if goods are exempt from tax generally under the state sales tax law, then the central sales tax will also be exempt or charged at a lower rate.

Issues

The court interpreted the exemption granted under Government Order No. 159 as conditional and specific to the industrial unit producing the goods, rather than a general exemption. Therefore, the dealers' claim for exemption under Section 8(2-A) was denied.

Judgment

Thus, the court allowed the review petitions and dismissed the appeals filed by the dealers

In conclusion, the court set aside the judgment in Pine Chemicals, as it had incorrectly interpreted Section 8(2-A) of the Central Sales Tax Act, and dismissed the appeals filed by the dealers seeking exemption.

CWT VS AMETEUR RIDERS CLUB, BOMBAY 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603

Brief Facts

1. The case involves a special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993, which has been delayed by 264 days.

2. The Court has previously expressed concern over the government's appeals being lost due to the point of limitation and the resulting prejudice to public interest.

3. Despite previous observations by the Court, there has been no significant improvement in the timely filing of petitions, as evident in the present case filed in November 1993.

4. The petitioner explains that the special leave petition was drafted by the Advocate-on-Record and sent for approval to the Board on June 24, 1993, along with the case file.

5. The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993, who resent it to the Board on September 20, 1993, stating that the draft SLP was not approved.

6. The Board eventually approved the draft SLP and sent the file to the Central Agency Section (CAS) on October 1, 1993.

Judgment

1. Considering the binding nature of the law of limitation that applies to everyone, the Court finds no grounds for granting relief in this case.

2. The Court expresses its inability to assist a litigant, even if it is the government, when the litigant falls outside the scope of permissible relief.

3. Consequently, the Court dismisses the application for condonation of delay and dismisses the special leave petition as barred by time.

DR. D.C WADHWA AND ORS VS STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS 1987 AIR 579, 1987 SCR (1) 798

Brief Facts

The petitioner, Dr. D.C. Wadhwa, was a professor of economics in Pune who had extensively researched and published about the misuse of the ordinance making power of the governor of Bihar.

Between 1967 and 1981, the government of Bihar had promulgated 256 ordinances, which were kept alive for periods ranging between one and fourteen years by mechanically re-promulgating the ordinances without changing any content of the ordinance or trying to turn it into an Act.

The immediate challenge in the case was to the three ordinances that were kept alive for a period of 10-14 years. The main issue contested was whether the Governor could mechanically re-promulgate the ordinance for an indefinite period of time, and thus take over the power (from the legislature) to legislate through the powers conferred on him under Article 213.

Issues

Whether the Governor can mechanically re-promulgate the ordinance for an indefinite period of time, and thus take over the power (from the legislature) to legislate through the powers conferred on him under Article 213.

Whether the petitioners had legal standing to challenge the validity of re-promulgation of the ordinances.

Judgment

The court ruled that the mechanical re-promulgation of the ordinances for a period of one to fourteen years without going to the legislation was a colourable exercise of power by the executive and ruled that re-promulgation of ordinances was unconstitutional.

The court also provided two exceptions to this rule in which re-promulgation can be allowed: (1) if the legislature cannot take it up due to existing legislative business and (2) if the government feels that an emergent situation has emerged and re-promulgation is necessary to deal with it.

DR. D.C WADHWA AND ORS VS STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS 1987 AIR 579, 1987 SCR (1) 798

Brief Facts

The petitioner, Dr. D.C. Wadhwa, was a professor of economics in Pune who had extensively researched and published about the misuse of the ordinance making power of the governor of Bihar.

Between 1967 and 1981, the government of Bihar had promulgated 256 ordinances, which were kept alive for periods ranging between one and fourteen years by mechanically re-promulgating the ordinances without changing any content of the ordinance or trying to turn it into an Act.

The immediate challenge in the case was to the three ordinances that were kept alive for a period of 10-14 years. The main issue contested was whether the Governor could mechanically re-promulgate the ordinance for an indefinite period of time, and thus take over the power (from the legislature) to legislate through the powers conferred on him under Article 213.

Issues

Whether the Governor can mechanically re-promulgate the ordinance for an indefinite period of time, and thus take over the power (from the legislature) to legislate through the powers conferred on him under Article 213.

Whether the petitioners had legal standing to challenge the validity of re-promulgation of the ordinances.

Judgment

The court ruled that the mechanical re-promulgation of the ordinances for a period of one to fourteen years without going to the legislation was a colourable exercise of power by the executive and ruled that re-promulgation of ordinances was unconstitutional.

The court also provided two exceptions to this rule in which re-promulgation can be allowed:

(1) if the legislature cannot take it up due to existing legislative business and 

(2) if the government feels that an emergent situation has emerged and re-promulgation is necessary to deal with it.

D.K BASU VS STATE OF WEST BENGAL, STATE OF U.P 1996

Brief Facts

DK Basu was the Executive Chairman of Legal Aid Services, West Bengal, and a non-political organization. He addressed a letter to the Supreme Court of India drawing the courts attention to a piece of news published in various newspapers about deaths in police custody and lockups.

In the letter, it was mentioned that such crimes of custodial violence always went unpunished despite the efforts made and urged the courts to look into the matter so that the family members of the victims are given some form of compensation. He requested that the letter be treated as a Writ Petition within the “Public Interest Litigation” category.

Considering the significance of the issues brought up in the letter, it was treated as a written petition and the defendants were informed.

Issues

 Whether there is an increase in the cases of custodial death and violence?

 Whether there is a need for guidelines for arrest and custody of detenu?

 Whether the police officers be held liable for custodial death and violence?

 Whether custodial death and violence amounts to violation of Article 21 of the detenu?

Judgment

The Apex Court further laid down the following guidelines and said that arrest and detention will be subject to the guidelines. The violation of these guidelines would attract not only the departmental action but also the contempt of court proceedings in a High Court having the jurisdiction over the matter.

The person arrested must be made aware of his right to have someone informed of his arrest or detention as soon he is put under arrest or is detained.

The arrestee may be allowed to meet his attorney during interrogation, although not throughout the interrogation.

D.K JOSHI VS CHIEF SECTRETARY, STATE OF U.P 1999

Brief Facts

1. Mr. D.K. Joshi filed a writ petition in 1992 alleging that the supply of drinking water in Agra city was highly polluted, contaminated, and unfit for consumption.

2. The petition stated that despite existing legislation, the concerned authorities had not taken adequate measures to address the issue, causing suffering to the residents and visitors of Agra.

3. The court issued notices to the relevant authorities, and affidavits were filed in response, revealing that some initiatives were taken but were insufficient.

4. The court ordered the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) to submit a report on long-term measures for drinking water supply, sewerage and drainage systems, and solid waste disposal in Agra.

5. The State of Uttar Pradesh was directed to provide information on the projects undertaken regarding these issues.

6. Several status reports were filed by the State, indicating some steps taken but falling short of the necessary measures.

Issues

Mr. Parikh, the petitioner's counsel, argued that the latest status report was unsatisfactory and requested continued court monitoring.

Judgment

The court decided not to retain the case further but issued directions to the State and appointed a Monitoring Committee headed by the Commissioner of Agra.

The State of U.P. was instructed to issue a notification forming the Committee within three months.

D.N TANEJA VS BHAJAN LAL 1988 SCR (3) 888, 1988 SCC (3) 26

Brief Facts

1. The appellant filed an application for contempt against the respondent in the High Court.

2. The complaint was regarding interference by the respondent with the due course of judicial proceedings.

3. A Single Judge of the High Court considered the application, affidavits, and submissions made by the parties.

4. The Single Judge concluded that it was not a fit case for the court to exercise its jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act.

5. The application for contempt was dismissed by the Single Judge.

6. The appellant filed an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Act.

Issues

1. The respondent raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal under Section 19(1).

2. The objection was upheld by the Court, and the appeal was dismissed.

Judgment

1. The High Court derives its jurisdiction to punish for contempt from Article 215 of the Constitution.

2. An appeal under Section 19(1) of the Act is only available when the High Court makes an order or decision in exercising its jurisdiction to punish for contempt.

3. The High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Article 215 when it imposes a punishment for contempt.

4. When no punishment is imposed, it is difficult to argue that the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction conferred by Article 215.

DAL SINGH VS EMPEROR (1917) 19 BOMLR 510

Brief Facts

1. The appellant was convicted of murder by the Sessions Court of Jubbulpore and was sentenced to death.

2. The appellant filed a petition for leave to appeal to the King in Council, alleging illegal use of police diaries and wrongful estimation of witness credibility, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

3. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council heard the appeal and examined the procedure and evidence in detail.

4. The Judicial Committee outlined the limitations of its function in reviewing criminal cases, stating that interference occurs only in cases of serious injustice or denial of justice.

5. The murder victim, Kalia, was killed by blows from an axe, and the prosecution alleged that the appellant, Dal Singh, was the perpetrator.

6. The prosecution's case claimed that an altercation between Dal Singh and Mohan, Kalia's husband, led to the murder, with Mohan also involved.

Issues

1. The defense argued that Dal Singh was not present during the murder and that Mohan killed Kalia to falsely implicate Dal Singh.

2. The charges against the appellant and his servants were for rioting and murder, while the other servants were acquitted during the trial.

Judgment

1. The Privy Council determined that the use of the police diary by the Court of Appeal was incorrect and contrary to the law, but it did not warrant interference if substantial justice had been done.

2. The Privy Council found no reason to doubt the trial Judge's proper conviction and sentencing of the appellant and concluded that the error in procedure was not significant enough to justify interference.

3. The Privy Council recommended dismissing the appeal, stating that substantial justice had been served, and no costs were awarded, as is customary in such cases

DALBIR KAUR & ORS VS STATE OF PUNJAB 1977 AIR 472, 1977 SCR (1) 280

Brief Facts

1. The appellant was convicted of murder by the Sessions Court of Jubbulpore and was sentenced to death.

2. The appellant filed a petition for leave to appeal to the King in Council, alleging illegal use of police diaries and wrongful estimation of witness credibility, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

3. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council heard the appeal and examined the procedure and evidence in detail.

4. The Judicial Committee outlined the limitations of its function in reviewing criminal cases, stating that interference occurs only in cases of serious injustice or denial of justice.

5. The murder victim, Kalia, was killed by blows from an axe, and the prosecution alleged that the appellant, Dal Singh, was the perpetrator.

6. The prosecution's case claimed that an altercation between Dal Singh and Mohan, Kalia's husband, led to the murder, with Mohan also involved.

Issues

1. The defense argued that Dal Singh was not present during the murder and that Mohan killed Kalia to falsely implicate Dal Singh.

2. The charges against the appellant and his servants were for rioting and murder, while the other servants were acquitted during the trial.

Judgment

1. The Court of Appeal confirmed the conviction based on the evidence and the improper use of the police diary, leading to the appeal to the Privy Council.

2. The Privy Council determined that the use of the police diary by the Court of Appeal was incorrect and contrary to the law, but it did not warrant interference if substantial justice had been done.

3. The Privy Council found no reason to doubt the trial Judge's proper conviction and sentencing of the appellant and concluded that the error in procedure was not significant enough to justify interference.

4. The Privy Council recommended dismissing the appeal, stating that substantial justice had been served, and no costs were awarded, as is customary in such ca

DALBIR SINGH AND ORS VS THE STATE OF PUNJAB AIR 1962

Brief Facts

1. The case involves the interpretation and validity of Section 3 of the Pepsu Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1953.

2. The Act was enacted after the administration of the State of Pepsu was taken over by the President under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution.

3. The Act conferred the powers of the legislature of the State of Pepsu to the President.

4. The purpose of the Act was to provide penalties for spreading disaffection among the police force.

5. The appellants were charged with inducing or attempting to induce police officers to withhold their services, leading to a breach of discipline.

Issues

1. The appellants challenged the validity of their conviction under Section 3 of the Act, claiming it violated their freedom of speech guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

2. The appellants argued that Section 3 was not saved by Article 19(2), which allows reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech.

3. The central issue was whether Section 3 infringed upon the freedom of speech guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) and if it was saved by Article 19(2).

Judgment

1. The court held that Section 3 of the Act did not violate Article 19(1) (a) and was within the powers of the legislature.

2. It was established that the police force is responsible for maintaining public order, and any breach of discipline by its members poses a threat to public order.

3. The court rejected the appellants' argument that Article 33 of the Constitution was applicable, stating that the delegated powers of the legislature to the President did not have the force of Parliamentary legislation.

4. Ultimately, the court upheld the validity of Section 3 of the Pepsu Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1953, and affirmed the appellants' convictions.

DALJIT SINGH DALAL VS UNION OF INDIA 1997

Brief Facts

1. The case is a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in May 1993 by the original petitioner, Daljit Singh Dalal, in person, but he died soon after filing the petition.

2. The petitioner's son, Bajrang Singh, argued the case as a party in person, claiming to be a lawyer.

3. The disputed premises, located in Delhi, consisted of Premises Nos. 2505, 2506, and 2670 in Basti Punjabian, Subzi Mandi.

4. On May 13, 1993, portions of House No. 2670 were demolished by the Municipal Corporation, trapping the petitioner's father, daughter, daughter-in-law, and her three small children on the second floor.

5. The petitioner filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court on the same day and obtained an order for the rescue of the trapped family members. They were rescued on May 14, 1993.

6. The original petitioner entered a coma and was taken to the hospital, where he later died.

Issues

The petitioner alleges that the demolition was a mala fide act by the Municipal Corporation, instigated by the fourth respondent due to the petitioner's and his father's support for widows of Sikhs killed in the Delhi riots.

Judgment

1. The Municipal Corporation, with police assistance, removed one covered enclosure constructed on public land. On May 13, 1993, they demolished the illegal mezzanine, first, and second floors on the public road in front of Property No. 2670.

2. The respondents deny blocking the staircase and assert that the petitioner and his family members did not allow the removal of debris (malba).

3. The court finds several disputed questions of fact and determines that no public interest is involved in the case. As a result, the writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.

DANDU LAKSHMI REDDY VS STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 1999

Brief Facts

1. Dandu Lakshmi Reddy and his mother Narayanamma were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for the death of Lakshmi Devi, the wife of Dandu Lakshmi Reddy.

2. The prosecution's case was that Lakshmi Devi was harassed by her husband and mother-in-law due to her inability to bear children. On the day of the incident, they allegedly set her on fire.

3. The prosecution relied on two dying declarations made by Lakshmi Devi, one to a Judicial Magistrate and another to a Sub Inspector of Police, in which she accused the appellant and his mother of setting her on fire.

Issues

1. The defence argued that Lakshmi Devi had mental imbalance and suicidal tendencies. They claimed that she either set herself on fire or the fire was accidental while cooking

Judgment

1. The court highlighted the inherent weaknesses of dying declarations, including the lack of cross-examination, and the possibility of false or vengeful statements.